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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional doctrine of assumption of the risk was a potent defense
that sheltered negligent defendants from liability to injured plaintiffs in a
wide variety of settings ranging from injuries at sporting events1 to
employees injured on the job prior to the enactment of workers’
compensation legislation.2 The focus of this consent-based defense was
on whether there was a “voluntary acceptance [by the plaintiff] of a
specific, known and appreciated risk.”3
That defense had been narrowed to the point of virtual extinction by
the liberal California Supreme Court of the pre-1986 era.4 The lawmaking
1. See Brown v. S.F. Baseball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
2. See Lamson v. Am. Ax & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900).
3. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 715 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
4. See generally Neil M. Levy & Edmund Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the
Crossroads, 67 CAL. L. REV. 497 (1979).
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style of that court has been described by supporters and detractors as a
“policy oriented judicial activism . . . remaking the entire body of tort law”
by eliminating barriers to recovery for negligently injured plaintiffs.5
That lawmaking style is equally characteristic of the more conservative
court of the post-1986 era, but the present-day court’s policy preference
has been to limit these avenues to recovery. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in the area of assumption of the risk.
In a series of cases, beginning in 1992, this more conservative court
has reinvented the doctrine of assumption of the risk, replacing the
traditional consent-based defense with a potentially far reaching regime
of no-duty rules. The court’s major focus in this endeavor has been the
development of no-duty rules applicable to sporting activities. On one
level, these no-duty-for-sports rules are straightforward. As the court
explained in a trilogy of decisions with opinions written by Chief Justice
George, “as a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to recognize a
duty of care when to do so would require that an integral part of the sport
be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in sporting
events.”6 Based on this policy, the court in its 1992 decision in Knight v.
Jewett held that coparticipants in active sports breach a duty of care to
each other only if they “intentionally injure[] another player or engage[]
in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the
ordinary activity involved in the sport.”7 In Knight and in subsequent
decisions expanding the reach of this “intentional injury/recklessness”
rule, the court has been careful to point out that different categories of
defendants play different roles in sports injury cases, “including owners
of sports facilities, manufacturers of sports equipment, and coaches and
instructors.”8 To determine whether the intentional injury/recklessness
rule should be extended to relieve these categories of defendants from a
duty of due care, courts are to focus on the “nature of the sport itself[,] . . .
the defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport[,]” and the policy
considerations that might justify relieving a defendant from a duty of
reasonable care.9
5. Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises—One Step
Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 823 (1975); see also James A.
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51
IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976).
6. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003).
7. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711.
8. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 39.
9. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709.
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Unfortunately, things are not this simple. Knight and subsequent cases
also appear to have endorsed a second no-duty rule that is analytically
distinct from the sports participant intentional injury/recklessness rule
and the framework and policies of that rule. As stated by Knight,
“defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a
plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.”10 The only apparent
criterion for the invocation of this no-duty rule appears to be a court’s
determination that a risk posed by a defendant is an inherent risk of an
activity in which the plaintiff is engaged. This is a true no-duty rule, not
a “limited-duty” rule such as the intentional injury/recklessness rule. If
the court finds a risk is inherent, summary judgment is appropriate.
We write that Knight and subsequent cases appear to endorse the
inherent risk no-duty rule because, unlike the intentional injury/
recklessness rule, the inherent risk no-duty rule has not been responsible
for any of the California Supreme Court’s holdings exempting defendants
from a duty of due care. These holdings have been based on the intentional
injury/recklessness rule. The inherent risk no-duty rule, however, has
figured in court of appeal decisions11 and has been the central,12 and at
times exclusive,13 focus of highly critical academic commentary. Dylan
Esper and Gregory Keating, for example, see these decisions as “abusing
duty” by intruding on the traditional role of juries to make determinations of
negligence.14 We share this concern. We also note that this inherent risk
no-duty rule has been held by lower courts to relieve owners of sports
facilities from a duty of due care, thus bypassing the analytic and policy
framework carefully established under the intentional injury/recklessness
rule. These courts have ignored the insistence by Knight and subsequent
California Supreme Court decisions that before relieving defendants
from a duty of due care, courts should focus on the “nature of the sport
itself[,] . . . the defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport[,]” and
whether imposing “a duty of care . . . would require that an integral part
of the sport be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in
sporting events.”15

10. Id. at 708.
11. See, e.g., Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
12. See, e.g., Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 265 (2006).
13. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending
to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 334 (2006).
14. Esper & Keating, supra note 12.
15. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709; Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38
(Cal. 2003).
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The inherent risk no-duty rule, in addition, has been the source of
confused, or at least confusing, analysis. In its 1997 decision in Parsons
v. Crown Disposal Co., for example, the court wrote:
[T]here are circumstances in which the relationship between defendant and
plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the part of the defendant to use due care not to
increase the risks inherent in the plaintiff’s activity. For example, a purveyor of
recreational activities owes a duty to a patron not to increase the risks inherent
in the activity in which the patron has paid to engage. . . . Likewise, a coach or
sport instructor owes a duty to a student not to increase the risks inherent in the
learning process undertaken by the student.16

A person who is not well versed in the law in this area could well
assume from this passage that purveyors of recreational activities and
coaches or sports instructors owe a similar duty to injured persons and
that this is a duty of due care. In fact, however, they may owe different
duties. Coaches and instructors, as we will see, only owe a duty to
refrain from intentionally injuring the athlete or engaging in reckless
conduct totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the
sport. Purveyors of recreational activities, in contrast, may owe patrons
a duty of due care—except with respect to risks that a court may
determine are inherent in the sport. In cases where a risk is considered
to be inherent in the sport, the defendant may not owe a duty of due care,
but this is not because of the intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule.
Rather, it is because of the no-duty-for-inherent-risk rule. So, even in
this situation, the duties owed by coaches or instructors and purveyors of
recreational activities are not the same.17
But enough with this confusion. In this Article, we hope to untangle
the confused no-duty-for-sports rules the court has created over the past
decade and a half. We will argue that much of this confusion stems from
the court’s carrying over terminology and concepts of the traditional
assumption of the risk defense. In Part II, we set forth the law of
assumption of the risk as it stood prior to the court’s decision in Knight.
Parts III through V then carefully trace the adoption and elaboration of
the no-duty-for-sports doctrine. These Parts attempt to expose the roots
16. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 86–87 (Cal. 1997) (citations
omitted).
17. The confusion continues to this day. In the 2006 decision of Avila v. Citrus
Community College District, for example, the court wrote that “coaches and instructors
have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation . . . [and] those
responsible for maintaining athletic facilities have a similar duty not to increase the
inherent risks . . . .” 131 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006).
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of the confusion that surround this doctrine. In Part VI, we suggest ways
in which the court could clarify duty analysis in this area while retaining
the basic analytic and policy framework laid out in Knight. We will
explain, for example, that employment of the inherent risk concept
serves no analytic purpose. It can only lead to confusion, and that label
should be abandoned. The concept of inherent risk has also been carried
over from the older cases. We will explain that the court of appeal
decisions that have employed this concept can be better understood as
decisions in which the court has determined that, as a matter of law, the
defendant was not negligent. California tort law would be well served if
courts avoided the use of the inherent risk concept. Doing so would
bring badly needed clarity to the law in this area. Our goal in this Article
is to provide this clarity and to rein in the haphazard spread of this new
no-duty rule to areas such as commercial premises, where the policy
justifications for the rule are inapplicable. In Part VII, the conclusion,
we briefly review the steps the court could take to achieve this goal.
II. LI V. YELLOW CAB CO., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, AND
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
The traditional doctrine of assumption of the risk was a formidable
defense that sheltered negligent defendants from liability to injured
plaintiffs. Its focus was on the plaintiff’s knowledge and voluntary
acceptance of risk.18 The doctrine applied to plaintiffs in a broad range
of cases including persons injured on amusement park rides, spectators
at sporting events,19 sports participants,20 and employees injured on the
job prior to workers’ compensation legislation.21
However, this doctrine fell on hard times. Critics objected to the
consequences of the doctrine: like contributory negligence it leaves
injured plaintiffs to bear the consequences of defendant negligence.
Critics also assailed the doctrine as a needless source of confusion and
complexity in the law and as a doctrine that often led to unfair, harsh—
even draconian—results.22 As a consequence, in 1963, the New Jersey
Supreme Court abolished the doctrine.23 In its view, the cases in which

18. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 715 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. S.F. Baseball Club, 22 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
20. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 700 for a discussion of the traditional application of
the doctrine of assumption of the risk in these situations.
21. See Lamson v. Am. Ax & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900).
22. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
23. See McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240–41 (N.J. 1963)
(completing the abolition of assumption of the risk by banishing primary assumption of
the risk as well); see also Meistrich v. Casino Area Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 95–96
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the doctrine had been employed were, in fact, cases in which the
defendant was not negligent or in which the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, and “it was erroneous to suggest to the jury that assumption of
the risk was still another issue.”24 Experience had shown that “the term
‘assumption of risk’ is so apt to create mist [rather than aid comprehension]
that it is better banished from the scene.”25
California took a different path. In 1975, the California Supreme
Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California abolished the doctrine of
contributory negligence and adopted a system of pure comparative
negligence.26 The court thereby greatly increased the incidence of
defendant liability. After Li, plaintiff negligence no longer completely
bars recovery in negligence suits; rather, damages are only “diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.”27 The court rejected modified comparative negligence—a
system in which plaintiff fault, if great enough, totally bars recovery—to
avoid merely shifting “the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence
rule to a different ground.”28 Li recognized that “fault determinations
should not completely frustrate the policy of loss distribution.”29
The court’s express disapproval in Li of doctrines that totally bar
recovery due to plaintiff’s conduct led to a secondary holding dealing
with assumption of the risk. The court had previously exhibited its antagonism
toward this defense, and Li held that “the defense of assumption of risk
[is merged] into the general scheme of assessment of liability in
proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of
assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory
negligence.”30 These are cases “where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes
to encounter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant’s negligence.”31
Li thus merged cases of unreasonable assumption of the risk into its
comparative fault regime, leaving open the question of the status of
reasonable assumption of the risk. Because of a perception that it would

(N.J. 1959) (subsuming secondary assumption of the risk into the doctrine of contributory
negligence).
24. McGrath, 196 A.2d at 239–40.
25. Id. at 240–41.
26. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
27. Id. at 1243.
28. Id. at 1242 (footnote omitted).
29. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 4, at 509.
30. Li, 532 P.2d at 1241.
31. Id. at 1240.

389

URSIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

9/4/2008 11:30:47 AM

be anomalous to totally bar recovery of reasonable plaintiffs, many
believed that Li would lead to a complete abolition of the traditional
defense of assumption of the risk.
III. KNIGHT V. JEWETT: THE ABOLITION OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
AND THE CREATION OF A NEW NO-DUTY REGIME
A. The Abolition of Consent-Based Assumption of the Risk
It was not until the 1992 companion cases of Knight v. Jewett32 and
Ford v. Gouin33 that the California Supreme Court resolved the question
left open by Li. Recasting the issue thought to be left open in Li, nowChief Justice George wrote in Knight that “the distinction in assumption
of risk cases to which the Li court referred . . . was not a distinction
between instances in which a plaintiff unreasonably encounters a known
risk . . . and instances in which a plaintiff reasonably encounters such a
risk.”34 Instead, the distinction was between
(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal
conclusion that there is “no duty” on the part of the defendant to protect the
plaintiff from a particular risk . . . and (2) those instances in which the defendant
does owe a duty . . . but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury
caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty . . . .35

In the first category of cases—the no-duty cases—the plaintiff is barred
from recovery whether or not he behaved reasonably. In the second
category of cases, where the defendant does owe a duty but the plaintiff
knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach
of that duty, the plaintiff may recover but the amount of recovery is
determined by comparative fault principles.
At this analytical level, it is fair to say that Knight abolished the
traditional defense of assumption of the risk, which was precisely how
Justice Kennard characterized the decision in her dissent.36 To maintain
continuity with its Li decision, however, the Knight court retained the
terminology of assumption of the risk. The court termed the first category
of cases—the no-duty cases—“primary assumption of risk” cases.37 The
second category was termed “secondary assumption of risk.”38 Despite
the retention of this terminology, Justice Kennard’s characterization is
accurate. If a plaintiff previously barred by recovery under assumption
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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of the risk is still to be barred, it will be because the defendant’s conduct
did not breach a legal duty of care to the plaintiff. If a defendant breaches a
duty owed to a plaintiff, the plaintiff will recover an amount determined
by comparative fault principles.
Knight, however, created a more complex situation than this analysis
has so far suggested because, in addition to introducing this new mode of
analysis, Knight also introduced a new regime of no-duty rules. It will
thus be necessary in the future to understand how this no-duty regime
will be applied.
B. The Intentional Injury/Recklessness No-Duty Rule
1. The No-Duty Rule and Policy
Knight involved a touch football game in which one participant was
injured by the rough play of another. Although the court in Knight
abandoned the traditional, consent-based doctrine of assumption of the
risk, it held that summary judgment for the defendant was proper because
the defendant did not breach any duty of care owed to the plaintiff.39 In
reaching this result, the court created a new no-duty rule.
At its simplest level, Knight created a no-duty rule applicable to
coparticipants in active sports. This no-duty rule was policy driven. In
its subsequent decision in Kahn v. East Side Union High School District,
the court explained that “as a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to
recognize a duty of care when to do so would require that an integral part
of the sport be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in
sporting events.”40 Knight “stressed the role of the participant in the
sport and the likely effect on the sport of imposing liability on such
persons.”41 In the court’s view, to “impose liability on a coparticipant
for ‘normal energetic conduct’ while playing—even careless conduct—could
chill vigorous participation in the sport” and could “alter fundamentally
the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging
in activity.”42 Accordingly, the court created a no-duty rule: “[C]oparticipants
breach a duty of care to each other only if they ‘intentionally injure[]

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 712.
75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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another player or engage[] in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”43
2. Knight’s Policy Basis Assessed
The no-duty rule protecting participants in active sports followed from
the court’s view that to “impose liability on a coparticipant for ‘normal
energetic conduct’ . . . while playing—even careless conduct—could chill
vigorous participation in the sport” and could “alter fundamentally the
nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in
activity.”44 In the dissent, Justice Kennard questioned whether “the policy
basis for [the court’s] duty limitation—that the law should permit and
encourage vigorous athletic competition . . . .”—justified the broad sweep of
its no-duty rule.45 In her view, a “no-duty rule [might be justified] as
applied to organized, competitive, contact sports with well-established
modes of play, [but] it should not be extended to other, more casual
sports activities, such as the informal ‘mock’ football game . . .” involved in
Knight itself. 46 In such situations, “the policy basis for the duty
limitation . . . is considerably weakened or entirely absent.”47
In a similar vein, Stephen Sugarman has written that “there may well
be good policy reasons generally to prevent lawsuits by professional
athletes for injuries suffered as part of the game through the fault of
other participants.”48 These include the presence of existing rulemaking
bodies, penalty structures, and “reasonably generous injury insurance
schemes that go well beyond what workers’ compensation would
provide . . . .”49 Thus, the “social objectives that tort law might serve by
providing a remedy” may well already be served by alternative
institutions.50 This, however, is not the case with participants in
nonprofessional recreational sports. In Sugarman’s view, the broad noduty rule adopted by Knight rests on “a dubious empirical judgment”
regarding the chilling effect of liability based on normal negligence
principles.51

43. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 711).
44. Id. at 38 (citations omitted).
45. Knight, 834 P.2d at 723 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 848
(1997). Sugarman’s article is the indispensable guide to the modern doctrine of assumption
of the risk.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as the Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California
Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 485 (1999).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has rejected Knight, concluding that
“the rules of negligence govern liability for injuries incurred during
recreational team contact sports.”52 The court found that the “negligence
standard, properly understood and applied, accomplishes the objectives
sought by the courts adopting the recklessness standard, objectives with
which we agree.”53 The objective the court referred to is striking “the
proper balance between freeing active and vigorous participation in
recreational team contact sports from the chilling effect of litigation and
providing a right of redress to an athlete injured through the fault of
another.”54
The court found the negligence standard effective because it can adapt
“to a wide range of situations. An act or omission that is negligent in
some circumstances might not be negligent in others.”55 To determine if
conduct constitutes negligence, the fact finder must weigh
the sport involved; the rules and regulations governing the sport; the generally
accepted customs and practices of the sport (including the types of contact and
the level of violence generally accepted); the risks inherent in the game and
those that are outside the realm of anticipation; . . . and the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, including the ages and physical attributes
of the participants, the participants’ respective skills at the game, and the
participants’ knowledge of the rules and customs.56

By examining these factors, the negligence standard becomes “sufficiently
flexible to permit the ‘vigorous competition’” desired.57
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court has agreed with
Knight and cited a concern that may underlie the Knight holding. It
wrote that “[o]ne might well conclude that something is terribly wrong
with a society in which the most commonly-accepted aspects of play—a
traditional source of a community’s conviviality and cohesion—spur[]
litigation.”58 In its view, the recklessness standard “recognizes a commonsense
distinction between excessively harmful conduct and the more routine

52. Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 29 (Wis. 1993). In that
case, a forty-five-year-old plaintiff claimed that he was “slide tackled” by a fifty-sevenyear-old opponent during a soccer game, producing serious injury and violating league
rules. Id.
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994).
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rough-and-tumble of sports that should occur freely on the playing fields
and should not be second-guessed in courtrooms.”59
Whether based on a perhaps dubious policy of not chilling vigorous
participation or a desire to preclude unseemly litigation over “the most
commonly-accepted aspects of play—a traditional source of a community’s
conviviality and cohesion,” the Knight holding represents a rejection of
the view that juries should be trusted to mediate disputes utilizing the
“fundamental principle” that liability should be imposed on a defendant
“for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or
skill.”60 As such, it is part of a broader trend in California Supreme Court
decisions of the past two decades limiting the discretion of juries to impose
liability based on general negligence principles.61 But the question of
primary concern in this Article is with the specific rules of the Knight
no-duty regime, their policy bases, and how far this no-duty regime will
spread beyond the specific no-duty rule adopted in Knight for
participants in active sports.
3. The Rowland Duty Framework and Knight
Five years after Knight, in Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., the court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice George, elaborated on the relationship
between the Knight no-duty rule and the broader duty framework established
by the court in its landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian.62 Parsons

59. Id.
60. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1714 (West 2008)).
61. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989) (establishing more
rigorous criteria for plaintiff recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress
bystander cases). Critics of the liability-expanding decisions of the Traynor and Bird
eras had been critical of negligence decisions that expanded the discretion given juries to
impose liability based on broad negligence principles. A paradigm case for these critics
was Rowland v. Christian’s abandonment of tradition landowner rules in favor of a
general duty of reasonable care. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564. James Henderson, for example,
wrote in 1976:
The reforms and changes in the law of negligence in recent years have,
purportedly to advance identifiable social objectives, eliminated much of the
specificity with which negligence principles traditionally have been formulated.
We are rapidly approaching the day when liability will be determined routinely
on a case by case, “under all the circumstances” basis, with decision makers
(often juries) guided only by the broadest of general principles. When that day
arrives, the retreat from the rule of law will be complete, principled decision
will have been replaced with decision by whim, and the common law of
negligence will have degenerated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly disguised
lottery.
Henderson, Jr., supra note 5, at 468.
62. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 561; see Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70,
82–84 (Cal. 1997).
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involved a horseback rider thrown from his horse as a consequence of
the horse having been frightened by noise from the defendant’s garbage
truck.63 The court identified a traditional no-duty rule limiting the duty
that operators of machinery owe to horseback riders. The court in Parsons
pointed out that this machinery operator no-duty rule should not be
confused with its Knight no-duty rule. The court wrote that not every
case “in which a court concludes that a defendant has not breached a
duty of care needs to be denominated a ‘primary assumption of risk’ case.
Instead, ‘primary assumption of risk’ simply describes a subcategory of
those cases in which the defendant has not breached a duty of care.”64
Parsons recognized that to assess the viability of the no-duty rule
applicable to machinery operators—or other no-duty rules—courts should
engage “in a traditional duty inquiry utilizing the policy considerations
set out in Rowland v. Christian . . . .”65 In its 1968 landmark Rowland
decision, the California Supreme Court established the framework for
analyzing duty issues. In Rowland, the court wrote of the “fundamental
principle” that liability should be imposed “for an injury occasioned to
another by his want of ordinary care or skill.”66 Courts would depart
from this principle only upon the “balancing of a number of
considerations,” the major ones of which are
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.67

Thus, in Parsons, the court began with Rowland’s statement that as “a
general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for
injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
circumstances.’”68 The determination “[w]hether a given case falls within
an exception to this general rule . . . ‘is a question of law to be determined
on a case-by-case basis.’”69 This assessment is to be based on the Rowland
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Parsons, 936 P.2d at 72–73.
Id. at 87–88 n.25 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 87.
Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 2008)).
Id. at 564.
Parsons, 936 P.2d at 80 (quoting Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564).
Id.
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policy considerations, to which the court added “the social value of the
interest which the actor is seeking to advance.”70 In the court’s view,
these considerations, on balance, supported the traditional limited
common law duty regarding machinery operators frightening horses.71
As the court recognized, the Knight no-duty-for-sports rule is a
“subcategory of those cases in which the defendant has not breached a
duty of care.”72 The Knight framework can be seen to truncate the
Rowland analysis to focus on considerations that are especially relevant
to sports participants. The Knight policy of not chilling vigorous
participation by sports participants to avoid altering fundamentally the
nature of the sport can be seen to focus on Rowland’s “extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing
a duty to exercise care,” and perhaps the “moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct.”73
4. Extensions of Knight’s Intentional Injury/Recklessness
No-Duty Rule Beyond Participants?
Knight raises the question of how courts are to determine when
careless conduct in other situations will fall within its new no-duty rule.
Because Knight abolished the traditional consent-based defense of
assumption of the risk, defendants previously protected from liability by
that doctrine may now seek shelter under Knight’s new no-duty regime.
This may be the case in suits against hockey arena owners by spectators
injured by pucks that fly into the stands.74 Similarly, ski resorts will
claim to owe no duty when skiers are injured on their slopes.75 And
amusement parks will do likewise when patrons are harmed by what
they allege to be the negligent design of “thrill” rides. In the well known
Murphy (Flopper) case, for example, Judge Cardozo held that
assumption of the risk applied to a patron of an amusement park ride in
his suit against the park owner.76 Such defendants will now seek protections
under Knight’s no-duty (primary assumption of the risk) rule. In fact,

70. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS 171 (5th ed. 1984)).
71. Id. at 84.
72. Id. at 88 n.25 (emphasis omitted).
73. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.
74. See, e.g., Nemarnik v. L.A. Kings Hockey Club, L.P., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10, 18
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that hockey arena owner owed no duty to eliminate the
inherent risk of injury to spectators caused by flying pucks).
75. See, e.g., Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 395 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006); Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 859 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
76. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
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Disneyland and Knott’s Berry Farm have done precisely this in litigation
involving severe injuries occurring on high speed rides such as the
Indiana Jones attraction.77 These cases might seem a far cry from touch
football, but such defendants often had avoided the need to litigate
negligence claims because of the traditional assumption of the risk
defense. Knight raises the question of how these and other cases will be
resolved now. Fortunately, the Knight court provides a framework for
developing a new no-duty regime.
5. The Knight Framework
As the Knight court recognized, the question is “how courts are to
determine when careless conduct of another [falls within the Knight noduty rule].”78 The answer to this question is not “dependent on the knowledge
or consent of the particular plaintiff.”79 Rather, it “turns on whether the
defendant had a legal duty to avoid such conduct or to protect the
plaintiff against a particular risk of harm.”80 In the sports context, a
defendant’s duty “depends heavily on the nature of the sport itself.”81 In
anticipation of the prospect that its Knight ruling might be argued to
extend to nonparticipants, the court wrote, “[a]dditionally, the scope of
the legal duty owed by a defendant frequently will also depend on the
defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.”82
Sports injury cases, the court wrote, involve “diverse categories of
defendants whose alleged misconduct may be at issue . . . .”83 These
include “owners of sports facilities such as baseball stadiums and ski
resorts[,] . . . manufacturers and reconditioners of sporting equipment[,] .
. . sports instructors and coaches[, and] . . . coparticipants . . . .”84 In the
“sports setting, as elsewhere, the nature of the applicable duty or standard of
care frequently varies with the role of the defendant whose conduct is at
issue . . . .”85
77. See Bolia-Schutt v. Cedar Fair, L.P., No. G033685, 2006 WL 401306, at *3
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2006).
78. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992).
79. Id. at 709.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 710.
84. Id.
85. Id. The focus is on “the nature of the defendants’ activities and the relationship of
the plaintiffs and the defendants to that activity to decide whether, as a matter of public
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The same event thus can involve different duties owed by different
defendants. To illustrate this point, the court used the example of a
baseball spectator injured by a thrown bat. In suits against the player
who threw the bat and the stadium owner
two different potential duties [are] at issue—(1) the duty of the ballplayer to
play the game without carelessly throwing his bat, and (2) the duty of the
stadium owner to provide a reasonably safe stadium with regard to the relatively
common (but particularly dangerous) hazard of a thrown bat. Because each
defendant’s liability rest[s] on a separate duty, there [would be] no inconsistency in
the jury verdict absolving the batter of liability but imposing liability on the
stadium owner for its failure to provide the patron “protection from flying bats,
at least in the area where the greatest danger exists and where such an
occurrence is reasonably to be expected.”86

Thus, the duty of the owner of a ballpark—or a ski resort—would be
defined “not only by virtue of the nature of the sport itself, but also by
reference to the steps the sponsoring business entity reasonably should
be obligated to take in order to minimize the risks without altering the
nature of the sport.”87
C. The “Inherent Risk” Duty Rules
As described, the Knight no-duty analysis is straightforward. In the
sports context, the focus is on the “nature of the sport itself[,] . . . the
defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport,” and the policy
considerations that might justify a no-duty-role.88 Post-Knight duty
analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that Knight can also be read
to create a second, separate no-duty rule and also to create new duties of
care where none had previously existed. This complexity is a consequence
of the court’s use of the “inherent risk” concept, which is carried over
from traditional assumption of the risk cases.89
In explaining its policy-driven sports participants duty holding, the
court employed the inherent risk concept. A long line of cases, including
the court’s 1968 landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian, had
established that “[a]s a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care
to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct
injures another person.”90 In the sports setting, however, the Knight

policy, the defendants should owe the plaintiffs a duty of care.” Neighbarger v. Irwin
Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 354 (Cal. 1994).
86. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y.
1929).
90. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
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court wrote, “defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself . . . .”91
Moreover, “[i]n some situations . . . the careless conduct of others is
treated as an ‘inherent risk’ of a sport, thus barring recovery by the
plaintiff.”92 For the policy reasons previously discussed, the court held
that this was the case for sports participants who thus would be liable
only in cases of intentional injury or conduct so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. Although
the inherent risk concept did no actual work in establishing Knight’s
sports participants holding, its use by the court suggests that Knight
established duty rules in addition to the recklessness rule.
1. No Duty for Inherent Risks?
After noting that “[a]s a general rule, persons have a duty to use due
care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless
conduct injures another person,” the court wrote that a property owner,
for example, “ordinarily is required to use due care to eliminate
dangerous conditions on his or her property.”93 However, “[i]n the
sports setting, . . . conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed
as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself.”94 To illustrate
this point, the court used the example of moguls on a ski run. The risks
posed by moguls are an “inherent risk” of the sport of skiing. Although
“moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that might not exist
were these configurations removed, the challenge and risks posed by the
moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to
eliminate them.”95
The statement that the resort has no duty to eliminate moguls raises
the question of what no-duty rule is being invoked by the court. It is
possible that the court meant that a ski resort owes a duty not to
intentionally injure its patrons or engage in conduct so reckless as to be
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
But this seems unlikely. At the point in the court’s opinion that it
discussed the mogul example, it had not introduced the intentional

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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injury/recklessness rule. Moreover, the ski resort is an owner of a sports
facility—not a participant. Knight laid out a clear analytic and policy
framework to be employed to decide whether categories of defendants
other than participants would be protected by its intentional injury/
recklessness rule. This framework was not utilized by the court in
reaching its conclusion that a ski resort has no duty to eliminate moguls.
That no-duty rule came into play because, in the court’s view, the risks
posed by moguls are an “inherent risk” of the sport of skiing.
This analysis suggests that Knight established a second no-duty rule
that is analytically distinct from the sports participant/recklessness rule
and the framework and policies of that rule. As stated by Knight,
“defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a
plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.” The only apparent
criterion for the invocation of this no-duty rule appears to be a court’s
determination that a risk posed by a defendant is an inherent risk of an
activity in which the plaintiff is engaged.96 This is a true no-duty rule,
not a limited-duty rule such as the intentional injury/recklessness rule. If
the court finds a risk is inherent, summary judgment is appropriate.
Moreover, this no-duty rule can be invoked without the usual Rowland
analysis and the weighing of its policy considerations and without
utilizing the Knight framework and policies. Thus the ski resort, a sport
facility, is protected by this no-duty rule in disregard of Knight’s
insistence that “the applicable duty . . . varies with the role of the defendant
whose conduct is in issue.”
2. A Duty Not to Increase Risk Over Inherent Risk?
The court in Knight wrote that although “defendants generally have no
legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the
sport itself, it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty
to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above
those inherent in the sport.”97 Returning to the ski resort example, the
court wrote that “although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls
from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its
towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose skiers to an
96. The court placed its sports participant/recklessness rule within this inherent risk
analysis. The court wrote that “[i]n some situations . . . the careless conduct of others is
treated as an ‘inherent risk’ of a sport, thus barring recovery by the plaintiff.” Id. The
“question [that Knight answers is] how courts are to determine when careless conduct of
another properly should be considered an ‘inherent risk’ of the sport that (as a matter of
law) is assumed by the injured participant.” Id. at 708–09. The Knight analytic framework
and policy analysis provided the methodology for answering this question—for determining
when defendants are protected by Knight’s recklessness rule.
97. Id. at 708.
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increased risk of harm.”98 In the towrope example, the “risk, posed by a
ski resort’s negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the sport) that is
assumed by a participant.”99 This analysis suggests that a broad general
duty might exist for persons who would otherwise not owe a duty of care
and who have no relationship to a sports participant or to a sporting
activity “to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and
above those inherent in the sport.”100
IV. EXTENSIONS OF KNIGHT’S INTENTIONAL INJURY/
RECKLESSNESS RULE
A. Extension of the Intentional Injury/Recklessness Rule to Golf
In Knight the court expressly left open the question whether a limited
duty of care comparable to its Knight no-duty rule should be applied to
“less active sports, such as archery or golf.”101 In 2007 the court in Shin v.
Ahn answered this question, holding that “the primary assumption of risk
doctrine does apply to golf and that being struck by a carelessly hit ball
is an inherent risk of the sport.”102 Thus “golfers have a limited duty of
care to other players, breached only if they intentionally injure them or
engage in conduct that is ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”103 The court found court of
appeal decisions that had previously reached this conclusion convincing.
One of these, Dilger v. Moyles, had found Knight’s policies applicable to golf:
While golf may not be as physically demanding as . . . basketball or football,
risk is nonetheless inherent in the sport. Hitting a golf ball at a high rate of
speed involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an
unintended direction. . . .
Holding participants liable for missed hits would only encourage lawsuits and
deter players from enjoying the sport. . . . Social policy dictates that the law
should not discourage participation in such an activity whose benefits to the
individual player and to the community at large are so great.104

The court in Shin agreed with this conclusion.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711 n.7.
Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007).
Id. at 590.
Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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B. Extension to Some Intentional Torts
In 2006 the court expanded the protection of the Knight rule to cover
what would otherwise be an intentional tort by a participant.105 In Avila
v. Citrus Community College District, it held that a community college
whose baseball team is engaged in intercollegiate competition owes “no
duty to [an opposing batter at the plate] to prevent [its] pitcher from
hitting batters, even intentionally.”106 The court wrote that “in the
sporting context, [primary assumption of the risk] precludes liability for
injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a sport . . . .”107
Knight, it will be recalled, had held that a participant’s careless conduct
is to be treated as an inherent risk of a sport, precluding liability for such
conduct. In contrast, a breach of a legal duty of care would exist in two
types of situations: (1) if the participant “intentionally injures another
player”; or (2) if the participant “engages in conduct that is so reckless as
to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the
sport.”108 In Avila the court conflated these two categories: “an athlete
does not assume the risk of a coparticipant’s intentional or reckless
conduct ‘totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the
sport.’”109 Having made this move, the court ruled that “even if the . . .
pitcher intentionally threw at [the plaintiff], his conduct did not fall
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.”110 It thus
held that the plaintiff’s action was barred by primary assumption of the
risk. Avila, therefore, can be seen to convert Knight’s two prong inquiry
into a single inquiry: whether conduct—intentional or reckless—is
“totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.”
Avila, however, is best read as a holding limited to the well-entrenched
practice of pitchers occasionally throwing at batters. This reading
of Avila is certainly consistent with the court’s treatment of the
recklessness/intentional injury rule in its other decisions111 and with the
court’s discussion in Avila of the well-established practice of pitchers
occasionally throwing at batters. After surveying a variety of authorities,
the court took judicial notice of the fact that, despite official disapproval,
“pitchers have been throwing at batters for the better part of baseball’s
century-plus history.”112 It noted that pitchers “intentionally throw at
105. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006).
106. Id. at 394.
107. Id. at 391.
108. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711.
109. Avila, 131 P.3d at 394.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007); Kahn v. E. Side Union High
Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003).
112. Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 n.12.
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batters to disrupt a batter’s timing or back him away from home plate, to
retaliate after a teammate has been hit, or to punish a batter for having
hit a home run.”113 Indeed, the practice is “so accepted by custom that a
pitch intentionally thrown at a batter has its own terminology: ‘brushback,’
‘beanball,’ ‘chin music.’”114 Based on these considerations, the court
concluded that “[f]or better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a
fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of baseball. It is not the
function of tort law to police such conduct.”115 Under this reading, Avila
simply creates an exception, specific to baseball, to Knight’s general rule
that participants owe a duty not to intentionally injure other participants.
C. Categories of Defendants
1. Coaches and Sports Instructors: Kahn v. East Side
Union High School District
In 2003 the court in Kahn extended Knight’s no-duty/recklessness rule
to coaches and sports instructors. At the same time, it created confusion
regarding future applications of this no-duty rule.
In Kahn the court reaffirmed Knight’s analytic and policy framework
and extended its intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule to coaches.116
In an opinion for the court, Chief Justice George wrote that “the question
of duty depends not only on the nature of the sport, but also on the ‘role
of the defendant whose conduct is at issue . . . .’”117 Crucial to the
Knight holding was the “role of the participant in the sport and the likely
effect on the sport of imposing liability on such persons.”118 As a
“matter of policy”—to not “discourage vigorous participation”—the Knight
court had adopted a no-duty rule to be applied to protect participants in
active sports.119
In Kahn the court again pointed to the different roles played by
different defendants, “including owners of sports facilities, manufacturers of
sports equipment, and coaches and instructors.”120 Indeed, “[d]uties with
respect to the same risk may vary according to the role played by
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Kahn, 75 P.3d at 30.
Id. at 38.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 39.
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particular defendants involved in the sport.”121 The court again used the
thrown baseball bat example. The “batter would not have a duty to
avoid carelessly throwing the bat after getting a hit . . . .”122 The fear is
that a full duty of care might chill “vigorous deployment of a bat in the
course of the game . . . .” In contrast, “a stadium owner . . . may have a
duty to take reasonable measures to protect spectators from carelessly
thrown bats.”123 In the cases of the stadium owner, “reasonable steps
may minimize the risk without altering the nature of the sport.”124
When the court in Kahn turned to the question of whether Knight’s noduty rule should be extended to a new category of defendants—
coaches—it concluded that although the coach’s role is different from a
participant, an analogous policy was involved: the policy of not having a
“chilling effect on the enterprise of teaching [by challenging a student]
and learning skills that are necessary to the sport. At a competitive level,
especially, this chilling effect is undesirable.”125 The court wrote that
“[t]o impose a duty to mitigate the inherent risks of learning a sport by
refraining from challenging a student . . . could have a chilling effect on
the enterprise of teaching and learning skills that are necessary to the
sport.”126 In the sports setting the “object to be served by the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk . . . is to avoid recognizing a duty of care
when to do so would tend to alter the nature of an active sport or chill
vigorous participation in the activity.”127 Since this “concern applies to
the process of learning to become competent or competitive in such a
sport,” the “standard set forth in Knight . . . as it applies to coparticipants,
generally should apply to sports instructors . . . .”128 Thus a plaintiff
must allege and prove that “the instructor acted with intent to cause a
student’s injury or that the instructor acted recklessly in the sense that
the instructor’s conduct was ‘totally outside the range of the ordinary
activity’ . . . in teaching or coaching the sport.”129

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
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Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992)).
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2. Kahn’s Policy Assessed
Despite the similarities between participants and coaches or sports
instructors, the Knight policies become more attenuated in the latter
situation. Justice Kennard in a dissenting opinion and Justice Werdegar
in a concurring opinion pointed to significant differences in the two
situations. Justice Kennard criticized the majority for its failure to recognize
“the significant difference between the two groups.”130 Although “[p]ersons
participating in active sports have to expect that a coparticipant may play
too roughly[,] . . . coaches of student athletes teach them the skills
necessary to perform their sport of choice safely and effectively.”131
Looking back on his experience on a high school baseball team, a New
York Times writer has recounted how the coach holds an almost god-like
position for a young inexperienced athlete.132 The student will do almost
anything the coach asks without question. In this vein, Justice Kennard
noted that “[b]ecause student athletes, particularly minors, often consider
their coach a mentor or role model, they trust the coach not to carelessly
and needlessly expose them to injury.”133 In her view, “[t]he majority’s
decision puts an end to that trust.”134 Rather than affirming that societal
expectation and imposing a corresponding legal duty, the “standard the
majority imposes is dangerously lax; it puts concern for the physical
safety of children far down on a secondary school coach’s list of priorities.”135
In contrast, the negligence standard “would leave coaches free to
challenge or push their students to advance their skills level as long as
they do so without exposing the student athletes to an unreasonable risk
of harm.”136
In a similar vein, Justice Werdegar wrote that unlike a competitor, “a
coach . . . stands somewhat apart from the fray, . . . observing and directing
the competition, . . . keep[ing] a cooler head than the competitors.”137
130. Id. at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also id. at 49 (Wedegar, J., concurring)
(arguing that the court should recognize a greater duty on the part of instructors than
participants owe to each other).
131. Id. at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
132. Michael Lewis, Coach Fitz’s Management Theory, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March
28, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
133. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 49 (Wedegar, J., concurring).
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As such, a coach is uniquely situated to anticipate potential problems and
protect students from unnecessary harm. “Society expects . . . more from
. . . coaches than merely that they will refrain from harming a student
intentionally or with wanton disregard for safety.”138 Although school
sports “are certainly valuable, . . . they are not more important than, for
example, emergency cardiac care . . . and . . . require no greater immunity
than the law grants such highly useful activities.139
3. Owners of Sports Facilities and Manufacturers of
Sporting Equipment?
If an extension of no-duty rules to manufacturers of sports equipment
or owners of sports facilities were to be proposed, the Knight/Kahn
framework counsels that a court should first examine the category of
defendant seeking the protection of a no-duty rule and the role played by
that defendant. Then it should examine the policies applicable to the
category and role. And in doing this, it should acknowledge the
different role and policies applicable to commercial enterprises, such as
manufacturers or sports facility owners, as opposed to individual sports
participants and coaches or instructors.
Sports participants and coaches make individual—often splitsecond—choices. Knight and Kahn were concerned that liability for
ordinary negligence might have a chilling effect on vigorous participation or
teaching and learning skills necessary to a sport. This concern gives
special prominence to the Rowland policy consideration of the “extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care” and perhaps to the “moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct.”140
In contrast, manufacturers and owners of sports facilities make conscious

138. Id.
139. Id. at 50. While the court expanded the reach of Knight’s inherent injury/recklessness
rule, it may also have adopted a relaxed definition of recklessness. In sending the case
back to the court to determine whether or not the coach was reckless, the court implies
that the standard for recklessness in primary assumption of risk cases may become closer
to negligence. In Justice Wedegar’s concurring opinion, she points out that while the
majority applies a recklessness standard, she does not understand that standard to be
equivalent to recklessness as it is sometimes understood, i.e., as the “willful or
wanton misconduct” shown when an actor has “intentionally done an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that
he must be taken to have been aware of it . . . .” Id. at 48 (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971)).
Justice Kennard seems to agree with Justice Wedegar in this assessment, as, in her view,
the allegations in Kahn state “a cause of action for negligence, not recklessness.” Id. at
53 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
140. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
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design—and, in the case of sports facilities owners, maintenance—
decisions affecting the safety of the many who, over time, use their
products or facilities. With respect to these commercial enterprises, other
Rowland considerations and policies assume greater prominence. Of
particular significance in the case of these commercial enterprise defendants
are “the policy of preventing future harm” and “the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”141 These commercial
enterprises are more responsive than individual actors to the safety
incentives created by liability rules,142 and negligence liability—as well
as strict liability in the case of manufacturers—is thought to be desirable
precisely because of its potential to create incentives for safety.143 Also,
these commercial entities will treat liability costs as part of their overall
business costs, eventually reflected in the prices charged for their
products and services and thus distributed to the public.144 A full duty of
reasonable care in these circumstances thus will have the desirable effect
of preventing future harm and distributing the burden of accident costs.
The Vermont Supreme Court reflected this perspective when it refused
to relieve a ski resort of a duty of due care in the case of a skier who
collided with a ski maze whose location and design were alleged to pose
an unreasonable risk of harm to skiers.145 The court wrote that the
“major public policy implications [were] those underlying the law of
premises liability.”146 It explained:
The policy rationale is to place responsibility for maintenance of the land on
those who own or control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents to the
minimum level possible. Defendants, not recreational skiers, have the expertise
and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence
of their agents and employees. They alone can properly maintain and inspect
their premises, and train their employees in risk management. They alone can
insure against risks and effectively spread the cost of insurance among their
thousands of customers. Skiers, on the other hand, are not in a position to
discover and correct risks of harm, and they cannot insure against the ski area’s
negligence.147

141. Id.
142. See Sugarman, supra note 48, at 867; Ursin, Business Premises, supra note 5,
at 829.
143. Ursin, Business Premises, supra note 5, at 829.
144. Id.
145. Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995) (holding a release from
negligence liability void).
146. Id. at 799.
147. Id.
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The Vermont Supreme Court thus refused to relieve the sport facility
owner of a duty of reasonable care toward its patrons, holding a release
to be invalid.148
The California Supreme Court’s analysis in both Knight and Kahn
points to a similar conclusion. In both cases, the court pointed to the
different roles played by different defendants, “including owners of
sports facilities, manufacturers of sports equipment, and coaches and
instructors.”149 Indeed, “[d]uties with respect to the same risk may vary
according to the role played by particular defendants involved in the
sport.”150 And in each case, the court drew a distinction between the
duties owed by individual baseball players and stadium owners by using
the example of a thrown bat.
The “batter would not have a duty to avoid carelessly throwing the bat
after getting a hit . . . .”151 The fear is that a full duty of care might chill
“vigorous deployment of a bat in the course of a game.”152 In contrast,
“a stadium owner . . . may have a duty to take reasonable measures to
protect spectators from carelessly thrown bats.” In the case of the
stadium owner, “reasonable steps may minimize the risk without altering
the nature of the sport.”153 The clear implication is that the court contemplated
that owners of sport facilities, and presumably manufacturers of sports
equipment, would be held to a standard of reasonable care.
This implication is supported by the law and policy developed by the
court in commercial premises cases. For example, in Ortega v. K-Mart
Corp.,154 the court developed an aggressive negligence rule—some have
argued approaching strict liability—to be applied to store owners in slip
and fall cases.155 The court in Ortega pointed to the “important policy
that places a premium on maintenance, a crucial factor in the storekeeper’s
duty to take [safety] precautions.”156
Manufacturers also play a very different role than either players or
coaches, and the law and policy developed by the court in the area of
products liability reflects this. California products liability cases have
long recognized that “public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
148. Id. at 800.
149. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal. 2003).
150. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id. See also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 709 (Cal. 1992).
153. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38.
154. 36 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2001).
155. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 651–52 (1992); Steven D. Winegar,
Comment, Reapportioning the Burden of Uncertainty: Storekeeper Liability in the SelfService Slip-and-Fall Case, 41 UCLA L. REV. 861, 893–94 (1994).
156. Ortega, 36 P.3d at 19.
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wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health . . . .”157 In Soule v. General Motors Corp.,158 for example, the
court reaffirmed the basic framework of its landmark 1978 decision in
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,159 which had established a two-prong
test for design defects, and refused to return products to a pure
negligence theory.160 It would be startling, indeed, if a court were to rule
that manufacturers of sporting equipment do not even owe a full duty of
reasonable care.161 Not surprisingly, courts of appeal early on recognized
that Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness rule does not apply to
products liability claims against manufacturers, and they reached an

157. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
158. 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
159. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
160. Soule, 882 P.2d at 308.
161. Of course, manufacturers and owners of sports facilities may once again trot
out the “policy argument that [imposing negligence liability] would lead to the demise or
substantially diminished availability of recreational services and programs.” See City of
Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095, 1112 (Cal. 2007). This would not be a
fact-based policy argument; it would be pure conjecture, unsupported by empirical
evidence. And the court rejected this type of argument in recent decisions involving
high-speed amusement park rides and recreational services and programs. See Gomez v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 51 (Cal. 2005); City of Santa Barbara, 161 P.3d 1095. In
City of Santa Barbara, for example, the court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice
George, that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement . . .
purporting to release [a defendant from] liability for future gross negligence . . . .” Id. at
1115. The court also indicated an increasing impatience with this type of conjectural
argument. The Chief Justice wrote:
[I]f the premise of defendants and their amici curiae were correct—that is, if
failing to enforce [such] agreements . . . would imperil the very existence of
sports and recreational industries—we at least would expect to see some
analogous evidence in the experience of those states that prohibit even
agreements releasing liability for future ordinary negligence.
Id. at 1110.
The court “brought [seven such states] to the parties’ attention and solicited supplemental
briefing concerning the defendants’ policy argument . . . .” Id. at 1112. It reported that
the defendants “concede[d] in their supplemental briefs that they found no empirical
support” for the claim that prohibiting agreements releasing defendants from negligence
liability “would lead to the demise or substantially diminished availability of recreational
services and programs.” Id. In the court’s view, the “circumstance that neither
defendants nor their supporting amici curiae have found from the experience of our sister
states any substantial empirical evidence supporting their dire predictions is . . . both
relevant and telling.” Id. at 1113.
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analogous conclusion with respect to claims against owners of sports
facilities.162
In light of this analysis, it may appear anomalous that among the court
of appeal cases the court relied on in Shin to extend Knight’s recklessness
rule to golf participants was American Golf Corp. v. Superior Court—a
case in which the defendant was the golf course, the owner of a sport
facility. Like Shin itself, the court of appeal in American Golf had relied
on the earlier Diliger decision, which had applied Knight’s recklessness
rule to golfers.163 In American Golf, a golfer’s shot ricocheted off a
wooden yard marker and injured his companion. The companion sued
the golf course for negligent design and placement of the markers.164
Relying on Diliger, the American Golf court applied the primary
assumption of the risk doctrine and directed the trial court to grant the
golf course’s motion for summary judgment.165
In Shin the California Supreme Court quoted American Golf’s holding
that “golf is an active sport, errant shots are an inherent risk of golf,
yardage markers are an integral part of the sport, and the golf course as
recreation provider did not increase the risk of injury by its design and
placement of the yardage marker.”166
American Golf’s holding—and the Shin court’s apparent approval of
this holding—suggest that owners of sports facilities, like golf courses,
may only owe sports participants a duty not to intentionally injure them
or engage in conduct totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport. On the other hand, both Knight and Kahn make
clear that before the Knight no-duty rule is extended to owners of sports
162. Thus, in 1993 in Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court, the court
concluded that it could “find nothing in the nature of . . . manufacturing . . . to indicate
that a finding of no duty on the manufacturer’s part should be made.” 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d
24, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. was not a sports case, but
subsequent decisions involving sports equipment have reached a similar conclusion. For
example, in a products liability action based on a claim of inadequate warning of danger
against the manufacturer of an above ground swimming pool, the court in Bunch v.
Hoffinger Industries, Inc. held that “assumption of risk does not insulate equipment
suppliers from liability for injury from providing defective equipment.” 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d
780, 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). More recently, in 2006, the court of appeal in Ford v.
Polaris Industries, Inc. reached the same conclusion with respect to design defects in a
case involving a jet ski. 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
In Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., decided in 1995, the court distinguished the duty
owed by co-participant golfers from that owed by owners and operators of golf courses,
holding that the latter “owed a duty of care to [golfers] in the design and maintenance
of . . . golf course[s].” 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see Dilger v.
Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
163. See Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 588 (Cal. 2007); Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior
Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
164. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686–87.
165. Id. at 690.
166. Shin, 165 P.3d at 587 (quoting Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685).
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facilities, a court should examine “not only . . . the nature of the sport,
but also . . . the ‘role of the defendant whose conduct is at issue. . . .’”167
And this examination should include an inquiry as to whether the Knight
policies apply. The court of appeal in American Golf did not engage in
such an examination, nor did the California Supreme Court do so in its
discussion of American Golf.
In fact, American Golf is better read as applying Knight’s second noduty rule: the no-duty-for-inherent-risk rule. American Golf illustrates
that this second no-duty rule can be applied to protect owners of sports
facilities without the need to consider Knight’s framework and policies.
The golf course and its yardage markers are equivalent to the ski resort
and moguls.
V. THE “INHERENT RISK” DUTY RULES
The inherent risk no-duty rule, it will be recalled, originated with
Knight’s discussion of the duties owed by a ski resort to its patrons.
Contrasting moguls on a slope with negligently maintained towropes, the
court wrote that although a ski resort has “no legal duty to eliminate (or
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, [such as
moguls on a slope,] it is well established that defendants generally do
have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over
and above those inherent in the sport[, for example, with unsafe
towropes].”168 This discussion suggested two duty rules in addition to
the intentional injury/recklessness rule: (1) a no-duty-for inherent risk
rule; and (2) a duty, where one might not otherwise exist, to use due care
not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in
the sport. In contrast to the intentional injury/recklessness rule, whose
framework was carefully laid out in Knight and subsequent cases, the
inherent risk duty rules are fraught with confusion and problematic in
their applications. Before discussing these rules in detail, however, we
examine a court of appeal decision that shaped the development of these
rules.

167.
168.

Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003).
Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992).
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A. The No-Duty For Inherent Risk Rule: An Early Application
Three years after the Knight decision, a court of appeal held that a ski
resort owed no duty to a skier who collided with one of its ski towers.169
Since a ski resort is a sports facility, one might have thought that the
court would apply the Knight framework and ask whether the policy of
chilling vigorous participation applies to such a defendant. That analysis,
called for when a court is deciding whether Knight’s intentional injury/
recklessness rule applies to a category of defendants, was not made.
Instead, the court applied Knight’s second no-duty rule: the inherent risk
no-duty rule, thus illustrating how this second no-duty rule can be
applied without regard to the Knight framework—or the duty analysis
called for by Rowland v. Christian.
Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area involved Mammoth
Mountain Ski Resort’s claim that it owed no duty to protect its patrons
from injuries caused by collisions with inadequately padded ski towers.170
The plaintiff in Connelly was injured when he lost control and collided
with a ski lift tower while skiing at defendant’s ski resort. The plaintiff
claimed that defendant had been negligent in not properly padding the
metal tower so as to cushion the blow and prevent his injuries.171 The
court of appeal upheld the trial court’s summary judgment for the
defendant.172 Relying in part on pre-Knight assumption of the risk cases,
the court reasoned that “primary assumption of risk arises where a
plaintiff voluntarily participates in an activity or sport involving certain
inherent risks . . . .”173 The court wrote that the plaintiff “collided with
a ski lift tower while skiing. This risk . . . is inherent in the sport.
Consequently . . . Mammoth, under the doctrine of primary assumption
of risk, owed no duty to protect [the plaintiff] against this inherent
risk.”174
The plaintiff in Connelly also had argued that Mammoth breached “a
different duty, the duty not to increase the inherent risks of skiing . . . by
failing to maintain adequate padding on the lift towers at snow level.”175
The court, however, found no authority requiring ski area operators to
pad lift towers. It would be anomalous, in the court’s view, “to hold an

169. Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 856 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 857.
172. Id. at 859.
173. Id. at 857.
174. Id. at 858.
175. Id.
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operator who padded its towers . . . more liable than an operator who
failed to do so.”176 The court found “no evidence . . . that Mammoth
increased the inherent risk of colliding with a ski lift tower while
skiing.”177 The Connelly court held that a skier “colliding with a ski lift
tower while skiing is an inherent risk within the doctrine of primary
assumption of risk, and [thus the ski resort] owed no duty to [the injured
skier] to protect him from this inherent risk.”178 The plaintiff in
Connelly could not “establish the duty element of his negligence and
negligence-based premises liability causes of action” and thus summary
judgment was appropriate.179
B. Knight as Duty-Creating?
1. Rejection of Knight as Creating a Broad
New Duty of Due Care
In Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., the court in 1997 attempted to
clarify its Knight ruling.180 In Parsons, the plaintiff was injured when
thrown from his horse which had been frightened by noise from the
defendant’s nearby garbage truck. The court of appeal had concluded
that, based on Knight, the defendant had a common law duty to avoid
increasing the risk of harm to the plaintiff over and above the inherent
risk in the activity of recreational horseback riding.181 The California
Supreme Court rejected this view.182
The court found that a traditional no-duty, or “limited duty,” rule applied.
Specifically, courts had long “recognized that a defendant breaches no
duty of care merely by operating socially beneficial machinery in a
manner that is regular and necessary, even if such ordinary operation
happens to frighten a nearby horse and, as a result of the horse’s
reaction, some injury or damage ensues.183 Although the defendant

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 859.
Id.
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997).
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Parsons, 936 P.2d at 72.
Id.
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had a duty to conduct its garbage collection activity in a prudent fashion (and to
use due care to avoid making unusual noises unnecessary to accomplish its
task), it had no duty to avoid making the regular noises that were a normal
incident to its operations merely because of the possibility that these ordinary
operations might happen to frighten a horse that was in the vicinity of its
truck.184

The plaintiff in Parsons argued that Knight was what might be called a
“duty creating” decision and thus, under Knight, a duty of due care was
owed to the horseback rider. It will be recalled that the court in Knight
had written that “[a]lthough defendants generally have no legal duty to
eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, . . .
defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the
risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.”185
This statement could be read as creating new duties of due care where
none had previously existed. The court in Parsons sought to correct this
impression.
The court made clear that Knight did not create a broad new general
duty of due care where none had previously existed. This should be no
surprise since Knight created a new no-duty regime. The Parsons court
rejected the “proposition that defendants generally owe a duty not to
increase the risk inherent in whatever activity plaintiffs happen to be
pursuing, regardless of the lack of relationship between defendant and
plaintiff.”186 Thus, in this case “in which defendant had no participatory
involvement in the activity undertaken by plaintiff, the decision in
Knight does not define whatever duty was owed by defendant to
plaintiff.”187
2. Knight as Duty-Creating in Organized Relationship Cases
Although the court in Parsons emphasized that Knight did not create a
broad new general duty of care where a duty of care had not previously
existed, its opinion nevertheless suggests that Knight is a duty-creating
decision for a limited group of defendants. The court wrote that the
Knight statement that defendants generally owe a duty not to increase the
risk inherent in a sporting activity “was made in the context of our
discussion of the duty owed by parties who have some organized
relationship with each other and to a sporting activity—in our example,
that of ski resort and ski patron.”188
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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Parsons, 936 P.2d at 84.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 86.
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The court then noted that court of appeal cases decided since Knight
illustrated that “there are circumstances in which the relationship
between defendant and plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the part of the
defendant to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in the
plaintiff’s activity.”189 Citing Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area190
as an example, the court wrote that “a purveyor of recreational activities
owes a duty to a patron not to increase the risks inherent in the activity in
which the patron has paid to engage.”191 “Likewise,” the court continued,
“a coach or sport instructor owes a duty to a student not to increase the
risks inherent in the learning process undertaken by the student.”192 In
contrast were cases, such as Parsons itself, in which the “parties have no
such (or similar) relationship—and instead are independent actors,
separately pursuing their own activities.”193 In these cases, “a defendant
generally has no duty to avoid increasingly the risks inherent in a
plaintiff’s activity.”194
It might seem, therefore, that the court in Parsons viewed Knight as
both creating a new no-duty rule for sports participants and establishing
a category of sports-related cases in which defendants have a “duty to
use due care not to increase the risk inherent in the plaintiff’s activity.”
This category includes purveyors of recreational activities and coaches
or instructors. These are “parties who have some organized relationship
with each other and to a sporting activity—in our example, that of ski
resort and ski patron.”195
189. Id. at 86–87.
190. Id. at 87 (citing Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 86. Similarly, the court in Avila v. Citrus Community College District,
131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006) treated Knight as a duty-creating decision. With respect to
Knight’s duty-creating aspect, the court wrote:
We have previously established that coparticipants have a duty not to act
recklessly, outside the bounds of the sport, and coaches and instructors have a
duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation; we also have
noted in dicta that those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities have a
similar duty not to increase the inherent risks, albeit in the context of businesses
selling recreational opportunities. In contrast, those with no relation to the
sport have no such duty.
Id. at 392 (citations omitted).
Turning to the duty owed by a college hosting an intercollegiate baseball game, the
court wrote that “the host school’s role is a mixed one: its players are coparticipants, its
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3. An Unnecessary Source of Confusion
Knight was not needed, however, to establish a duty of due care. As
the Parsons court recognized, Rowland had long ago established that
“[a]s a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is
liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in
the circumstances . . . .’”196 Thus coaches, purveyors of recreational
activities, and school districts would owe a duty to use due care not to
increase the risk inherent in the plaintiff’s activity unless for reasons of
policy a court were to include—as it did in Parsons with respect to
machine operators—that no such duty was owed.
Not only was Knight unnecessary to establish a duty of due care, but
to use it to do so injects confusion into the court’s analysis. In Kahn the
court quoted Parsons, writing “that ‘there are circumstances in which the
relationship between defendant and plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the
part of the defendant to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in
the plaintiff’s activity.’”197 For example, “a purveyor of recreational
activities owes a duty to a patron not to increase the risks inherent in the
activity in which the patron has paid to engage. Likewise, a coach or
sport instructor owes a duty to a student not to increase the risks inherent
in the learning process undertaken by the student.”198
One might have thought, based on this statement, that purveyors of
recreational activities and coaches or sports instructors owe participants
the same duty of care and that this duty is to use due care to avoid
injuring them. However, as we have seen, the Kahn court held as a matter
of policy that the protection of Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness
rule extends to coaches. Carelessness, in the case of coaches, is considered
an inherent risk of the sport.
So it turns out that a seemingly straightforward statement that a
defendant has “a duty . . . to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in
the plaintiff’s activity” means, in the case of a coach, a duty to use due
coaches and managers have supervisorial authority over the conduct of the game, and
other representatives of the school are responsible for the condition of the playing
facility.” Id. With regard to Knight as a duty-creating decision, the court found that the
District was “not a disinterested, uninvolved party vis-à-vis the athletes it invites to
compete on its grounds.” Id. The court thus disagreed with the argument that “the
District is little more than a passive provider of facilities and therefore should have no
obligation to visiting players.” Id. Instead, the court held that “in interscholastic and
intercollegiate competition, the host school and its agents owe a duty to home and
visiting players alike to, at a minimum, not increase the risks inherent in the sport.” Id.
196. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 80 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal.
1968)).
197. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal. 2003) (quoting
Parsons, 936 P.2d at 86–87).
198. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 87 (citations omitted).
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care not to act “with intent to cause a student’s injury or . . . [act]
recklessly in the sense that the instructor’s conduct was ‘totally outside
the range of the ordinary activity’ . . . in teaching or coaching the sport.”199
In other words, the “duty of due care” does not include a duty of due care.
In fact, the statement that a defendant owes a duty not to increase the
risks inherent in a sporting activity is meaningless. In translation, it amounts
to the statement that coaches and those responsible for maintaining
athletic facilities have a “similar” duty not to increase the inherent risks,
but their duties may not be similar. A statement that a defendant owes “a
duty not to increase the inherent risk” really means that a defendant owes
“some unspecified duty.” This is because “inherent risk” is an empty vessel:
as to some defendants, carelessness is an inherent risk; for others, it may
not be.
A more serious problem lurks behind this semantic confusion. If “a
purveyor of recreational activities” and “[l]ikewise a coach . . . [owe] a
duty not to increase the risks inherent [in an activity]” and coaches owe
only a duty to refrain from intentionally or recklessly injuring, it might
be inferred that purveyors of recreational activities “likewise” only owe
this limited duty.200 However, Kahn, by retaining and reemphasizing the
Knight framework, suggests that the extension of this no-duty rule to
another category of defendants such as purveyors of recreational activities
would only occur after the court’s examination of whether the Knight
policy of not chilling vigorous participation applied. The possibility
remains, however, that Knight’s second no-duty rule—the no-duty-forinherent-risk rule—might apply, illustrating once again the possibility
that this rule might bypass the duty analysis required by Knight and
Rowland and trump long-established premises liability policies.

199. Kahn, 75 P.3d. at 43.
200. The court’s 2006 Avila decision is illustrative. The court wrote that Knight
“established that coparticipants have a duty not to act recklessly, outside the bounds of
the sport . . . .” Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006). Next,
the court wrote that “coaches and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks
inherent in sports participation [and] . . . those responsible for maintaining athletic
facilities have a similar duty not to increase the inherent risks, albeit in the context of
businesses selling recreational opportunities.” Id. Since coaches and instructors,
according to Kahn, are protected by the same limited duty—not to intentionally or
recklessly injure—as participants, and those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities
have “a similar duty,” Avila could be read to suggest that those maintaining athletic
facilities or those who sell recreational activities owe only the limited duty not to
intentionally injure or engage in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the
range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.

417

URSIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

9/4/2008 11:30:47 AM

C. The Inherent Risk No-Duty Rule: Endorsement and Application
As will be recalled, the inherent risk no-duty rule originated with
Knight’s mogul example. In Parsons the court wrote, quoting Knight,
that “‘[a]lthough defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well
established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not
to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the
sport.’”201 Thus, the court continued, “‘although a ski resort has no duty
to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use due
care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition.’”202
In addition, the court in Parsons cited Connelly approvingly as illustrating
that “a purveyor of recreational activities owes a duty to a patron not to
increase the risks inherent in the activity in which the patron has paid to
engage.”203 But, of course, Connelly actually held that “colliding with a
ski lift tower while skiing is an inherent risk within the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk, and [thus the ski resort] owed no duty to [the
injured skier] to protect him from this inherent risk.”204
By its approving citation of Connelly and its repetition of Knight’s
analysis of the mogul example, Parsons seems to be endorsing a no-duty
rule that is independent of the framework and policies of the intentional
injury/recklessness no-duty rule. This is a no-duty rule applicable to
what a court determines are inherent risks posed by commercial premises
that provide recreational activities.
A similar endorsement can be found in cases subsequent to Parsons.205

201. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 85.
202. Id. (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 708).
203. Id. at 87 (citing Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
204. Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 859 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
205. In Avila v. Citrus Community College District, 131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006), the
case which extended the intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule to pitchers who
throw at batters, the court also considered three alternative plaintiff theories which were
unrelated to the court’s main holding regarding a pitcher intentionally hitting a batter. Id.
at 393. The first of these was that the District breached a duty to the plaintiff by
conducting the game in violation of the alleged rule prohibiting preseason games.
Because hosting such a game only exposed players to the ordinary inherent risks of
baseball, nothing about hosting the game enhanced those ordinary risks, and thus it did
“not constitute a breach of its duty not to enhance the ordinarily risks of baseball.” Id.
Failing to provide umpires, which was another theory propounded by the plaintiff,
“likewise did not increase the risks inherent in the game.” Id. at 395. Finally, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant breached a duty to him by failing to provide medical care after
he was injured. Id. The court, for a variety of reasons, doubted that the District owed such an
affirmative duty. Id. at 395–96. But even if it did owe some duty, that duty was satisfied
when the player’s own coaches were alerted to his condition. Id. at 396.
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For example, the court’s 2007 Shin v. Ahn golf participants decision206
relied on American Golf Corp., the previously mentioned case, in
which a golfer injured when a shot ricocheted off a wooden yard
marker sued the golf course for negligent design and placement of the
markers.207 The court of appeal applied the primary assumption of the
risk doctrine, holding that the golf course “had no duty to protect [the
plaintiff] from the inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot, and the
primary assumption of the risk doctrine [barred plaintiff’s] action.”208
The Shin court cited this holding approvingly.209 Thus, Shin can also be
seen to endorse Knight’s no-duty-for-inherent-risk rule.210 But, as is
Although the court analyzed these claims under the rubric of primary assumption of
the risk and the duty not to increase risks inherent in a sport, nothing in the court’s brief
analysis contradicts Justice Kennard’s conclusion, expressed in her dissent, that these
claims “can be disposed of without resort to the no-duty-for-sports rule.” Id. at 397
(Kennard, J., dissenting). The “District did not breach any duty to [the plaintiff] by
conducting the game” in violation of the rule prohibiting preseason games. Id. at 398.
Similarly, “baseball games are often played without umpires, and there is no reason to
impose on community colleges a duty to provide them.” Id. And finally, the “theory
(that the District failed to provide medical care) fails because . . . the District had no duty
to provide medical care when [the plaintiff’s] team came equipped with its own trainers,
who were present to treat his injuries.” Id.
206. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007).
207. Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 685 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
208. Id. at 690. In American Golf, the plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert in a
declaration stated that the yardage marker was dangerous and defective because of its
rigid and hard construction and its location near the fairway. Id. at 686–87. The court of
appeal noted that it is “common in the golf industry for hard yardage markers to be
utilized.” Id. at 689. The defendant’s “yardage marker system utilizing three wooden
posts on each side of the fairway is found in 20 to 25 percent of the nation’s golf
courses.” Id. From this, it concluded that “yardage markers are an integral part of the
sport of golf, and the yardage marker system used at golf course is standard in the
industry.” Id. The defendant “golf course did not increase the risk that [the plaintiff]
would be struck by an errant shot by the construction or placement of the . . . yard
marker.” Id. Therefore, the “golf course had no duty to protect [the plaintiff] from the
inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot, and the primary assumption of the risk
doctrine bars [the plaintiff’s] action.” Id. at 690.
209. Shin, 165 P.3d at 587.
210. American Golf’s holding, and the Shin court’s approval of this holding,
illustrates the ambiguities in the cases interpreting and applying the Knight no-duty rule.
The question American Golf raises is what duty a golf course owes to its patrons with
respect to design and placement of yard markers and other features of the golf course.
The case applied the primary assumption of the risk doctrine and it relied on Dilger, a
case involving a golfer’s duties. This suggests that, like the golfer in Dilger, the golf
course may only owe golfers a duty not to intentionally injure them or engage in conduct
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. On the other hand,
both Knight and Kahn make clear that before the Knight no-duty rule is extended to
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usually the case in these no-duty-for-sports cases, the matter is more
complex than this.
VI. CLARIFYING DUTY
The no-duty rules applicable to sporting activities have been the
source of considerable, but unnecessary, confusion. In our view, much
of this confusion comes from the court’s carrying over terminology and
concepts of the traditional assumption of risk defense, in particular the
term assumption of risk itself and the concept of inherent risk. Neither
of these concepts serves the goals upon which Knight is premised.
Indeed, the continued use of these concepts only frustrates these goals.
Both should be eliminated.
A. Eliminating Use of the Assumption of the Risk Concept
The no-duty-for-sports rule is just that: a no-duty rule. Referring to
the rule as “primary assumption of the risk” is misleading in that it
implicitly directs attention to the plaintiff rather than to the defendant.
But, as Knight makes clear, and the court subsequently reiterated, the
“focus [is not] upon whether . . . [the] plaintiff subjectively knew of, and
voluntarily chose to encounter, the risk of defendant’s conduct, or
impliedly consented to relieve or excuse the defendant from any duty of
care . . . .”211 As the court wrote in Parsons, “‘primary assumption of
risk’ simply describes a subcategory of those cases in which the
defendant has not breached a duty of care.”212
By retaining the terminology of the traditional assumption of the risk
doctrine, the court has created the danger that courts in the future will,
perhaps inadvertently, lapse into pre-Knight assumption of the risk
analysis, focusing on a plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or appreciation
of the risk and consent to excuse a defendant from a duty of care, which
the Knight court itself rejected.213 In fact, just this occurred in the
owners of sports facilities, a court should examine not only the “nature of the sport,” but
also the role of the defendant whose conduct is at issue. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696,
709 (Cal. 1992). And this examination should include an inquiry as to whether the
Knight policies apply. Neither the California Supreme Court in Shin nor the court of
appeal in American Golf engaged in such an examination. In fact, the court of appeal
does not even mention the Knight recklessness standard.
211. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. For an example of a reiteration of this statement, see
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 85 (Cal. 1997) (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d
at 708).
212. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 87 n.25 (emphasis omitted).
213. The Knight court itself seems to have lapsed into “pre-Knight” analysis. Using
the example of a ski resort which has been negligent in maintaining its towropes, the
court wrote that even if the plaintiff “actually is aware that a particular ski resort on
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court’s own 2006 decision in Priebe v. Nelson, in which the court wrote
that the “defense of primary assumption of risk” would not bar a claim if
the plaintiff did not know of a risk.214 If the risk was unknown to the
plaintiff, the defense of assumption of the risk “would not bar [the] claim
since [the plaintiff] could not be found to have assumed a risk of which
[he or] she was unaware.”215 This, of course, directly contradicts Knight’s
statement that its new no-duty (primary assumption of the risk) regime
“does not depend on the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or
appreciation of the potential risk.”216
In Knight the court explained why it retained the assumption of risk
terminology. Because the court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. had “indicated
that the preexisting assumption of risk doctrine was to be only partially
merged into the comparative fault system,” the court believed that its
“analysis . . . (distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption
of risk) . . . more closely reflect[ed] the Li holding” than the proposal to
abandon the assumption of risk terminology.217
The court may technically be correct in its statement that its choice
more closely reflected the Li holding, but the retention of risk terminology
in Knight did not accurately capture what the court did in Li. The court
in Li broke with traditional doctrine by casting aside the defense of
contributory negligence.218 It kept the assumption of risk terminology
because it was not prepared in that case to rule on whether reasonable
assumption of risk should also be subsumed into the comparative
negligence equation. And, even then, as the court has pointed out in
Shin v. Ahn, the Li court did not employ the terminology of primary and
secondary assumption of risk.219 That was introduced in Knight.
occasion has been negligent in maintaining its towropes, that knowledge would not preclude
the skier from recovering if he or she were injured as a result of the resort’s repetition of
such deficient conduct.” Knight, 834 P.2d at 709. In this situation, “the plaintiff may
have acted with knowledge of the potential negligence, [but] he or she did not consent to
such negligent conduct or agree to excuse the resort from liability in the event of such
negligence.” Id. (emphasis added). In apparent contradiction to this, the court wrote
immediately after this sentence that “[r]ather than being dependent on the knowledge or
consent of the particular plaintiff, resolution of the question of the defendant’s liability in
such cases turns on whether the defendant had a legal duty to avoid such conduct or to
protect the plaintiff against a particular risk of harm.” Id. (emphasis added).
214. 140 P.3d 848, 850 (Cal. 2006).
215. Id.
216. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709.
217. Id. at 707–08 n.6.
218. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975).
219. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 591 (Cal. 2007).
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Just as the court in Li made a clean break from contributory negligence by
adopting pure—as opposed to modified—comparative negligence, so the
court now should abandon the assumption of the risk label and
terminology. In California over the past decade and a half—as had
previously been the case in New Jersey—experience has shown that “the
term ‘assumption of risk’ is so apt to create mist [rather than aid
comprehension] that it is better banished from the scene.”220 The rule
adopted in Knight should simply be called the no-duty-for-sports
doctrine.221
B. Eliminating Use of the Inherent Risk Concept
The inherent risk concept was carried over from the traditional,
consent-based assumption of the risk cases. The confusion created by
the court’s use of the inherent risk concept and the apparent extension by
courts of appeal of the inherent risk no-duty rule to protect owners of
sports facilities, or commercial purveyors of recreational activities,
suggest the need to reexamine this concept. And the Knight decision is
the place to start.
In Knight the court wrote:
Although defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a
plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well established that
defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a
participant over and above those inherent in the sport.222

As this sentence illustrates, the inherent risk concept serves two purposes: to
identify the duty owed by a class of defendants to sports participants (not
to increase inherent risks) and to limit duty (no duty to protect against
inherent risks). The inherent risk is unnecessary for the first purpose and
undesirable when used for the second.

220. McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240–41 (N.J. 1963).
221. Another group of cases formerly analyzed under the assumption of the risk
doctrine has also been restated in no-duty terms. See Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609
(Cal. 1977); Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1994). This group of
cases grew out of what was known as the “fireman’s rule,” which barred firefighters
from bringing negligence actions against those who set fires. See Levy & Ursin, supra
note 4, at 529. A similar rule has now been applied to police and veterinarian cases. See
Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848, 854 (Cal. 2006); Neighbarger, 882 P.2d at 355. These
cases have been called by the court “occupational assumption of the risk” cases. See
Priebe, 140 P.3d at 852.
222. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
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1. Unnecessary to Create Duties
As we have seen, the statement that a defendant has a duty “to use due
care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those
inherent in the sport” does not tell us what duty a defendant owes. This
is because carelessness may or may not be considered an inherent risk of
a sport. When the court wrote in its 2006 Avila decision that “coaches
and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports
participation,” it also noted that “those responsible for maintaining
athletic facilities have a similar duty not to increase the inherent
risks.”223 Those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities, however,
may in fact not have a duty similar to that owed by coaches and
instructors. Coaches and instructors do not have a duty of due care;
those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities may have such a
duty.
Parsons makes clear that the statement that a defendant owes “a duty
to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above
those inherent in the sport”224 was not meant to create a general duty not
to increase the risk inherent in whatever sporting or recreational activity
plaintiff happens to be pursuing, regardless of the lack of relationship
between the parties.225 Rather, the “statement . . . was made in the
context . . . of the duty owed by parties who have some organized
relationship with each other and to a sporting activity—in our example,
that of ski resort and ski patron.”226 The inherent risk concept, however,
is not necessary to establish this duty. Under Rowland, ski resorts and
others have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others and may be
held liable if their careless conduct injures another person. Knight and
Kahn carve out a no-duty exception for participants and coaches in
active sports. Others, including owners of sports facilities, such as ski
resorts, and manufacturers of sporting equipment, owe a duty of due care
unless brought within Knight or some other no-duty rule.227
223. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006).
224. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
225. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 86 (Cal. 1997).
226. Id.
227. As Parsons recognizes, “independent actors, separately pursuing their own
activities” with no organized relationship with each other and to a sporting activity, may
be found to have no duty to a sports participant after engaging in a “traditional duty
inquiry utilizing the policy considerations set out in Rowland v. Christian.” Id. at 87.
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2. The Conflict with the Court’s Analytic and Policy Framework
Rulings under the inherent risk no-duty rule can have the undesirable
effect of canceling out determinations made under Knight’s analytic and
policy framework that a category of defendant should owe a duty of due
care. This effect can be seen in the line of golf no-duty cases, of which
Shin is the culmination. These cases trace back to a 1995 court of appeal
decision in Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc.228 In Morgan the plaintiff,
a golfer, had been hit by an errant tee shot from the fourth tee while
standing near the fifth tee.229 Balls hit from the fourth tee had sailed
over trees that stood between the fourth green and the fifth tee and
landed on or near the fifth tee before and after removal of one of these
trees. The plaintiff in the past had stood under the now-removed tree for
protection from flying golf balls. The plaintiff brought an action against
the owner of the golf course based on negligent design and maintenance
of its golf course.230 The superior court granted summary judgment,
holding that “primary assumption of the risk operated as a complete bar”
to the plaintiff’s claim.231 However, the court of appeal reversed, holding
that the “duty of a golf course towards a golfer is to provide a reasonably
safe golf course.”232
Morgan seems inconsistent with American Golf’s previously mentioned
holding that a golf course has “no duty to protect [golfers] from the
inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot.”233 However, these cases can
be reconciled by recognizing that they are dealing with different no-duty
rules. Morgan dealt with the question whether owners of golf courses,
like participants, would be liable only if they intentionally injure a golfer
or “engage in conduct ‘that is so reckless as to be totally outside the
range of the ordinary activity involved in’ [the sport].”234 The court held
that the intentional injury/recklessness rule does not apply to owners of
golf courses. American Golf held that the analytically distinct inherent
risk no-duty rule may apply.
The Morgan court saw the issue before it to be the reach of Knight’s
intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule. In deciding this issue, the
court closely adhered to the Knight framework. The court wrote that,
under Knight, when one sports coparticipant injures another, the duty
owed is “to not intentionally injure another player or to engage in

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

424

40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 683, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
Morgan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253.

URSIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 45: 383, 2008]

9/4/2008 11:30:47 AM

California’s No-Duty-for-Sports Regime
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

conduct ‘that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the
ordinary activity involved in’ [the sport].”235 Thus, if the defendant in
Morgan had been a coparticipant, “this would clearly be a primary
assumption of the risk case under Knight and the defendant would have
no liability” to the plaintiff.236
Here, however, the plaintiff was “not suing the other player; he [was]
suing the owner and operator of the golf course.”237 Under Knight, “before
concluding a case falls within primary assumption of the risk it is not
only necessary to examine the nature of the sport but also the ‘defendant’s
role in, or relationship to, the sport.’”238 After quoting from Knight’s
analysis of the different duties owed by ballplayers and stadium owners
with respect to thrown bats, the court wrote that, like the stadium owner,
the “owner and operator of the . . . golf course owes a different duty”
than do coparticipants; the “duty of a golf course towards the golfer is to
provide a reasonably safe golf course.”239 Quoting Knight, the court wrote
that this duty “requires the golf course owner ‘to minimize the risks
without altering the nature of the sport.’”240 Thus, “the owner of a
golf course has an obligation to design a golf course to minimize the risk
that players will be hit by golf balls, e.g., by the way the various tees,
fairways, and greens are aligned or separated.”241 Again drawing on Knight,
the court wrote:
In certain areas of a golf course, because of the alignment or separation of the
tee, fairway and/or greens, the golf course owner may also have a duty to
provide protection for players from being hit with golf balls ‘where the greatest
danger exists and where such an occurrence is reasonably to be expected . . .’
just as a baseball stadium owner may have a duty to provide protection for
spectators from thrown bats or errant balls in that part of the stadium where the
danger of being hit is particularly high and dangerous.242

The Morgan court concluded that the owner and operator of the golf
course “owed a duty of care to [the plaintiff] in the design and
maintenance of its golf course.”243 The evidence indicated “the area of

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
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Id.
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Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
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the fifth tee was a particularly dangerous place due to the design of the
fourth and fifth tees and the removal of the trees.”244 This evidence
“could support a finding that [the golf course] breached the duty of care”
to the plaintiff.245
Morgan’s statement that Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness rule
applies to golf participants technically was dictum. But Dilger v.
Moyles, a second court of appeal decision, so held.246 The Dilger court
noted Morgan’s holding that a golf course owner owes “a duty of
care . . . in the design and maintenance of its golf course” and the court’s
statement that “if the relationship between the parties was one of
coparticipants . . . this would clearly be a primary assumption of the risk
case under Knight.”247 Closely adhering to the Knight framework, the
Dilger court examined whether Knight’s policies applied to participants
in the sport of golf. It found that they did:
While golf may not be as physically demanding as . . . basketball or football,
risk is nonetheless inherent in the sport. Hitting a golf ball at a high rate of
speed involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an
unintended direction. . . .
Holding participants liable for missed hits would only encourage lawsuits and
deter players from enjoying the sport. . . . Social policy dictates that the law
should not discourage participation in such an activity whose benefits to the
individual player and to the community at large are so great.248

Thus, the duty owed by one golfer to another was to not “intentionally
injure[] . . . or engage[] in reckless conduct that is totally outside the
range of the . . . sport.”249 In Dilger, the defendant had failed to warn the
plaintiff of his errant shot. “[W]hile possibly negligent, [this] did not breach
a legal duty” to the plaintiff and thus summary judgment was appropriate.250
In Shin v. Ahn, the California Supreme Court endorsed Dilger, holding
that “the primary assumption of risk doctrine does apply to golf . . . .”251
The court reiterated Dilger’s policy rationale, quoting the passage noted
above.252 Shin thus held that “golfers have a limited duty of care to other
players, breached only if they intentionally injure them or engage in
conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the
ordinary activity involved in the sport.”253

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
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Leaving American Golf aside for the moment, the law resulting from
Morgan, Dilger, and Shin can be restated, and it is in line with what one
could have predicted from the Knight case itself. In suits between
golfers, the policy of not chilling vigorous participation applies and the
duty is to not intentionally injure or engage in conduct totally outside the
range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. In a suit by a golfer
against the owner of a golf course, however, a court must examine the
different role of, and relationship to, the sport of the golf course owner.
The policy of not chilling vigorous participation does not apply in that
situation. As in the case of a stadium owner in Knight’s thrown bat
example, the golf course owner owes golfers a full duty of reasonable
care in the design and maintenance of its golf course.
American Golf, of course, complicates matters. In American Golf, the
plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert in a declaration stated that the
yardage marker was dangerous and defective because of its rigid and
hard construction and its location near the fairway. He “asserted that
because of the design of the 13th hole, a golfer was likely to aim the tee
shot in the direction of the 200-yard marker, thus making the marker a
likely site for a ricochet shot” like the one that injured the plaintiff.254 In
apparent contradiction to Morgan’s holding that a golf course owes a
“duty of care to [a golfer] in the design and maintenance of its golf
course,”255 the American Golf court held that the golf course “had no
duty to protect [the golfer] from the inherent risk of being hit by an
errant shot, and the primary assumption of the risk doctrine bar[red the
golfer’s] action.”256
The court, however, purported to follow Morgan and Dilger. Citing
Dilger, the court first held that “[g]olf is an active sport to which the
assumption of the risk doctrine applies.”257 Then, quoting Morgan, the
court wrote that the “duty of care a golf course [has] towards a golfer is
to provide a reasonably safe golf course.”258 At this point, however, the

254. Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
255. Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
256. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
257. Id. at 689.
258. Id. Also quoting from Morgan the court wrote that this duty care “requires the
golf course owner ‘to minimize the risks without altering the nature of the sport.’” Id.
Thus
a golf course has an obligation to design a golf course to minimize the risk that
players will be hit by balls, e.g., by the way the various tees, fairways, and
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American Golf court’s analysis departed from that of the Morgan and
Dilger courts. Those courts, it will be recalled, had focused on whether
Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness rule applied to golfers and golf
course owners and operators. Thus, they had heeded Knight’s admonition
that “before concluding a case falls within primary assumption of the risk
it is not only necessary to examine the nature of the sport but also the
‘defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.’”259 Their conclusion was
that whereas participants are protected by Knight’s intentional injury/
recklessness rule, golf courses are not; they owe a duty of due care.
The American Golf court did not examine the golf course’s role in, or
relationship to, golf in reaching its conclusion that the “primary
assumption of the risk doctrine bar[red the plaintiff’s] action.”260 This
was because its holding was not based on the intentional injury/
recklessness rule. In fact, the court does not mention that rule. Instead,
it based its holding on the inherent risk no-duty rule.
The court wrote that the “question of duty [is] a function of the scope
and definition of a given active sport’s inherent risks.”261 Under this
duty doctrine, “participation in an active sport is governed by primary
assumption of risk, and a defendant owes no duty of care to protect a
plaintiff against risks inherent in the sport.”262 Without pausing to consider
whether the different role played by the owner and operator of a golf
course should lead to a different duty, the court simply stated, “[u]nder
the assumption of the risk doctrine, ordinarily a recreation provider owes
no duty to a participant in an active sport to use due care to eliminate
risks inherent in the sport.”263 It followed that the “golf course had no
duty to protect [the plaintiff] from the inherent risk of being hit by an
errant shot . . . .”264
The golf duty cases demonstrate the potential of the inherent risk noduty rule to trump determinations made under the analytic and policy
frameworks carefully articulated under Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness
rule. Employing this framework, the Dilger court held that owners and
operators of golf courses owe golfers who are hit by errant shots a duty
greens are aligned or separated. In certain areas of a golf course, because of
the alignment or separation of the tee, fairway and/or greens, the golf course
owner may also have a duty to provide protection for players from being hit
with golf balls ‘where the greatest danger exists and where such an occurrence
is reasonably to be expected’ . . . .
Id. (quoting Morgan, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 253).
259. Morgan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
260. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
261. Id. at 688.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 687–88.
264. Id. at 690.
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of care in the design and maintenance of golf courses.265 The American
Golf court agreed with this conclusion.266 Then, turning to the inherent
risk no-duty rule, it held that the owner and operator of the “golf course
[had] no duty to protect [the golfer hit by the ricochet] from the inherent
risk of being hit by an errant shot.”267
This holding, and similar holdings under the inherent risk no-duty
rule,268 are troubling. Unlike duty rulings under the intentional injury/
recklessness rule, they are not guided by the policy of not chilling vigorous
participation in a sport. Nor are they sensitive to the defendant’s role in,
or relationship to, the sport. In fact, rulings under the inherent risk noduty rule can cancel out determinations based on those considerations
that an owner or operator of a sporting facility owes a duty of due care to
a patron. In addition, these rulings ignore Rowland policy considerations of
special significance in the case of commercial enterprises: “the policy of
preventing future harm” and “the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.”269 By doing so, they undercut policies
that are central to the law governing commercial premises liability.270
Also, as we discuss next, the inherent risk no-duty decisions can be, and
have been, criticized for impinging on the proper role of juries.
3. The Role of Judge and Jury
Critics of California’s no-duty-for-sports regime have aimed special
criticism at what they see as the willingness by the California Supreme
Court and lower courts to usurp the role that properly should be assigned
to juries. Esper and Keating, for example, write:
The . . . basic role played by duty doctrine is to divide the labor of negligence
law between judge and jury. Judges determine whether the defendant’s conduct
will be judged by the standard of reasonable care, and juries apply that standard
to particular controversies, even when its application involves the exercise of
evaluative judgment. The evaluative role of the jury is one of the most
distinctive features of negligence adjudication.271

265. Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
266. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 857
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
269. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
270. See Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 36 P.3d 11, 19 (Cal. 2001); Sugarman, supra note
48, at 867; Ursin, Business Premises, supra note 5, at 821.
271. See Esper & Keating, supra note 12, at 270 (emphasis omitted).
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They complain that Knight and subsequent “primary assumption of risk
cases assign both the choice of legal standard and its application to the
facts to the judge.”272 Under Knight, “trial and appellate courts are asked
to make factual findings as to what risks are inherent in common
activities.”273
That criticism, as we will discuss, has merit when directed at decisions
invoking the inherent risk no-duty rule. It cannot, however, be fairly
directed at the California Supreme Court’s adoption and application of
the intentional injury/recklessness rule.
In Knight, the court decided that the conduct of a participant in an
active sport would not be judged by the standard of reasonable care.
Instead, it held that participants would be liable only if they intentionally
injure another participant or “engage in conduct that is so reckless as to
be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in” the
sport.274 Whether or not one agrees with the policy judgment that led to
the adoption of this rule, the court in adopting it was performing the role
traditionally assigned to courts—it was determining the standard by
which the conduct of a category of defendants would be judged.
In Knight, the parties were participating in a coed game of touch
football when the defendant knocked the plaintiff to the ground, stepped
on her hand, and injured her finger.275 It is true that the court affirmed
the trial court’s granting of summary judgment.276 The court did not,
however, usurp the jury’s role. It is for the jury to determine if a defendant
intentionally injured a plaintiff or engaged in reckless conduct that is
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport—if
the facts are such that a reasonable jury could so determine. In Knight,
the court held that the “conduct alleged . . . [was] not even closely
comparable to the kind of conduct—conduct so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport—that is a
prerequisite to the imposition of legal liability upon a participant in such
a sport.”277
The court’s most recent primary assumption of risk decision, Shin v.
Ahn, underscores this point. The plaintiff and defendant in that case
were playing golf together.278 Plaintiff was standing in front of the tee
box twenty-five to thirty-five feet from the defendant at a forty to fortyfive degree angle from the intended path of defendant’s tee shot as the
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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defendant teed off.279 The defendant “inadvertently ‘pulled’ his tee shot
to the left, hitting plaintiff in the temple.”280 There was dispute over
whether the defendant knew where the plaintiff was standing.281 The
trial court denied the defendant’s summary judgment motion.282 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the “record [was] . . . too sparse to
support a finding, as a matter of law, that defendant did, or did not, act
recklessly. This will be a question the jury will ultimately resolve based
on a more complete examination of the facts.”283 Shin “makes clear that
the issue of recklessness of a defendant’s action is an issue for the trier
of fact . . . [unless] no reasonable jury could find defendant’s actions so
reckless as to be outside the ordinary activity [involved in the sport].”284
If the Supreme Court’s decisions involving the intentional injury/
recklessness rule cannot be accused of usurping the jury’s role, the same
cannot be said of lower court decisions employing the inherent risk noduty rule. Unlike the former decisions, decisions under the inherent risk
no-duty rule do not involve the choice of the legal standard to be
assigned to categories of activity. These decisions are not about categories
of activity; they are about the facts of particular cases.
Knight’s use of the mogul example to introduce the inherent risk
concept is illustrative. The court wrote that although “a ski resort has no
duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use
due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not
to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm.”285 In the towrope
example, the “risk[] posed by a ski resort’s negligence[] clearly is not a
risk (inherent in the sport) that is assumed by a participant.”286 Since the
defendant in the mogul and towrope examples is the same—the owner of
the ski resort—the no-duty-for-inherent risk rule the court invokes in the
case of the mogul is not a rule applicable to all risks posed by the
operation of the resort. Rather, it is a rule based on finding a particular
risk to be “inherent.”

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 583–84.
283. Id. at 592.
284. Neil M. Levy, Commentary, Primary Assumption of Risk: Levy on Shin v.
Ahn, available at 2007 CAL. LEXIS 10356.
285. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992).
286. Id. at 708.
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Court of appeal decisions that find particular risks to be inherent
follow this pattern. In these decisions, courts state fact-specific conclusions
with no felt need to articulate any criteria that may have guided their
decisionmaking. Moreover, trial and appellate courts in these cases do
“make factual findings as to what risks are inherent in common
activities.”
The American Golf decision provides an example—and a contrast—to
the Supreme Court’s Shin decision under the intentional injury/recklessness
rule. In American Golf, it will be recalled, the plaintiff’s accident
reconstruction expert stated in a declaration that the yardage marker was
dangerous and defective because of its rigid and hard construction and
its location near the fairway. He “asserted that because of the design of
the 13th hole, a golfer was likely to aim the tee shot in the direction of
the 200-yard marker, thus making the marker a likely site for a ricochet
shot,” such as the one that hit the plaintiff.287
Despite this declaration, the court of appeal ordered that the defendant
golf course’s summary judgment motion be granted on the basis of
primary assumption of the risk.288 The court noted that it is “common in
the golf industry for hard yardage markers to be utilized.”289 The defendant’s
“yardage marker system utilizing three wooden posts on each side of the
fairway is found on 20 to 25 percent of the nation’s golf courses.”290
From this, it concluded that “yardage markers are an integral part of the
sport of golf, and the yardage marker system used at golf course is
standard in the industry.”291 The defendant “golf course did not increase
the risk that [the plaintiff] would be struck by an errant shot by the
construction or placement of the . . . yard marker.”292
The plaintiff in this case was hit by a ball when a hooked shot struck a
removable obstacle, which was not in the line of play and had not been
removed. There had been “no prior reports of injuries caused by the
construction or location of either this particular yardage marker or any of
the 84 removable wooden yardage markers located in the rough on both
sides of 14 fairways.” This was “not an area of great danger or a place
where such occurrences could reasonably be expected.”293 Thus, the
court held that the “golf course had no duty to protect [the plaintiff] from

287.
2007).
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
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the inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot, and the primary
assumption of the risk doctrine [barred plaintiff’s] action.”294
The “[p]laintiff’s expert’s opinion that this particular yardage marker
should have been located farther from the fairway or made of a softer
material [was] not sufficient to create a duty on the part of golf
course.”295 And, “[i]n any event, all of the plaintiff’s expert’s objections
to the location and construction of the yardage markers [were] negated
by the fact that the markers are indisputably visible to the players and
removable at the player’s discretion.”296
The criticism of “appellate courts [making] factual findings as to what
risks are inherent in common activities”297 can fairly be aimed at American
Golf and other decisions298 under the inherent risk no-duty rule. These
decisions can be fairly characterized as employing a standardless
inherent risk no-duty rule to improperly usurp the role assigned to juries
in our negligence system. As we will discuss shortly, it may well be that
summary judgment was appropriate in American Golf; but it was not
appropriate on the ground that the golf course “had no duty to protect
[the plaintiff] from the inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot.”299
Rather, this may have been a case in which the court could appropriately
rule as a matter of law that the defendant had not been negligent.
4. No Negligence as a Matter of Law?
The mogul example, which is used by Knight as well as commentators
to illustrate the inherent risk concept, also illustrates the point that
inherent risk cases can be better understood as cases in which courts may
appropriately rule as a matter of law that a defendant has not been
negligent. Neither Knight in discussing the mogul example nor the court
of appeal decisions applying the inherent risk no-duty rule have offered
criteria for identifying what risks are inherent (moguls, ski towers,
yardage markers) and what risks are not (towropes). Commentators
have, however, attempted to fill that void.

294. Id. at 690.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Esper & Keating, supra note 12, at 270.
298. See, e.g., Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
299. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
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For example, Catherine Hansen-Stamp has suggested that “[i]nherent
risks fall into two general categories: 1) those risks that are essential
characteristics of a recreational activity and. . .that participants desire to
confront: e.g., moguls, steep grades, exciting whitewater; and 2) those
undesirable risks which simply exist, e.g., falling rock or sudden, severe
weather changes.”300 Dylan Esper and Gregory Keating have offered a
variation of this. They write that “‘inherent risks’ of recreational activities
are constitutive of their character and essential to their enjoyment.
Eliminate those risks and you destroy or degrade the activity.”301 These
are risks that are “essential to the challenge and pleasure of the activities
that occasion them.”302 For example, if you “[e]liminate mogul fields
from expert ski slopes[,] you eliminate a characteristic which makes
expert runs more challenging and demanding than intermediate ones.”303
Although these definitions are similar and the mogul example is
common to both—and is Knight’s central example—their use of the
mogul example points to the problem with the inherent risk concept: to
state that a risk is “inherent” merely states a conclusion that there is no
duty.
When these authors, and the court in Knight, cite moguls as an
inherent risk of skiing and write that a ski resort has “no duty to remove
moguls from a ski run,” they undoubtedly have a particular type of ski
run in mind. Esper and Keating, for example, write that moguls are a
“characteristic which makes expert runs more challenging and demanding
than intermediate ones.”304 But what about moguls on an intermediate or
beginner run?
Decades ago, moguls were accepted as part of the sport of skiing and
skiers “got what nature offered.”305 Skiing over moguls poses a risk.
“Navigating a field of moguls requires speed, superhuman quads and the
bones and cartilage to withstand knee-jarring, lower-back-compressing
drops from mini-hill to valley.” Moguls “can dislodge skis, throwing
heels over heads and poles, hats and goggles flying.”306 Nevertheless, it
might have made sense at one time to say that it is reasonable for a ski
resort not to remove moguls from slopes. Indeed, it might have been
close to impossible to do so.

300. Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming’s
Recreational Safety Act—An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 249, 251 (1998).
301. Esper & Keating, supra note 12, at 298.
302. Id. at 299.
303. Id. at 298–99.
304. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
305. A mogul is a mound that forms wherever skiers turn repeatedly. Hannah
Nordhaus, The Big Combover, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004 at F4.
306. Id.
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In the last two decades, however, things have changed. As early as the
1950s, ski areas began to look for ways to reduce moguls. In the 1960s,
the “Sno-Cat,” a tracked vehicle towing a twenty-foot-wide culvert, had
been developed.307 And in “the mid-1980s . . . manufacturers added blades
to push snow back uphill and tillers to comb the hard pack into the silky
corduroy that many skiers now expect.”308 In fact, ski areas now refer to
snow on their slopes as “product” that they “groom” with Sno-Cats to
“smooth away any wrinkles or blemishes that might scare their best
customers: jet-loads of risk-averse baby boomers.”309 Today, grooming
of slopes is a marketing tool to attract skiers. Ads for ski areas tout “the
most groomed terrain on the planet,” and ski areas may groom beginner
and intermediate slopes daily, do lunch-time “touch-ups,” and email
maps to hotels that point out the day’s corduroy.310
If a ski resort’s employees carelessly failed to groom the intermediate
and beginner slopes and a skier on the first run of the day, not
expecting—and unable to navigate—“mini-hills and valleys,” were to go
tumbling “heels over head,” we doubt that the court would conclude that
the ski resort has no duty to protect the injured skier from this risk. This
situation is analogous to the court’s towrope example in which the court
wrote that the resort “clearly does have a duty to use due care to
maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose
skiers to an increased risk of harm.”311 Similarly, we believe a ski resort
clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its beginner and
intermediate slopes in a reasonably safe condition so as not to expose
skiers to an increased risk of harm.
The court’s statement that a ski resort has “no duty to remove moguls
from a ski run” might better be understood as a statement that, as a
matter of law, it is reasonable not to remove moguls on appropriate—
that is, advanced—ski runs. Just as it is reasonable to have slopes that
are steep even though they pose some danger, it is also reasonable to
have slopes with moguls for advanced skiers. These conditions do pose
some danger, but if the ski resort appropriately marks its trails as
advanced, intermediate, or beginner, these markers and the obviousness
of the danger satisfy the obligation to warn, and this warning satisfies the
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992).
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resort’s duty of due care. The resort has a duty of due care, but as a
matter of law the resort is not negligent. Courts and commentators at
times use “no-duty” as a shorthand reference for the conclusion that as a
matter of law a duty of due care has been satisfied,312 and the mogul
reference is an example of this tendency.
Likewise, Connelly and American Golf might be better explained as
instances in which no negligence existed as a matter of law. These cases
can be seen to involve negligent design of recreational facilities.
Changing the facts in Connelly or American Golf, by placing the ski
tower in the middle of a narrow beginner ski run or the yardage markers
in a riskier location, might well make a holding that the defendants were
reasonable as a matter of law inappropriate. A no-duty rule would not be
fact sensitive in this manner.
Treating the mogul example, Connelly, and American Golf as instances of
“no negligence” is preferable to treating them as announcing a no-duty
rule. It is widely recognized,313 and the court has acknowledged,314 that
in determining questions of duty the focus is on a category of conduct,
not on the specific facts of a case. In contrast, “no negligence” determinations
are based on the particular facts of a case. The inherent risk rulings are
of the latter type. As the towrope and ungroomed beginner or intermediate
slope examples illustrate, it would be inappropriate to hold that ski
resorts have no duty of due care in the maintenance of their sporting
facilities. However, on the facts of a particular case, it might be appropriate
to rule that a ski resort was reasonable as a matter of law.
Moreover, whereas the inherent risk concept is standardless, the “no
negligence” approach focuses the court’s attention on the variables that
should guide its decision. In the familiar Learned Hand formulation, the
focus is on “the magnitude of the loss if an accident occurs; the
probability of the accident’s occurring; and the burden of taking
precautions that would avert it.”315

312. See Sugarman, supra note 48, at 842; see also Esper & Keating, supra note 12,
at 284.
313. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 8 cmt. b,
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Robert Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law:
A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787, 791 (2001); Sugarman, supra note 48, at 843.
314. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 85 (Cal. 1997).
315. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32
(1972).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is time for the California Supreme Court to bring clarity to the noduty-for-sports rules that have developed in the decade and a half since
its Knight decision. The first step is the easiest. The court should simply
eliminate the assumption of the risk concept from its jurisprudence. That
term serves no analytic purpose and can, misleadingly, direct attention to
the plaintiff’s conduct or state of mind.316 As the court has recognized,
“‘primary assumption of the risk’ simply describes a subcategory of
those cases in which the defendant has not breached a duty of care.”317
The court should also make clear that Knight creates a single no-dutyfor-sports rule. This is the intentional injury/recklessness rule that has
been the basis of the court’s holdings in this area. The court has
established a clear analytic and policy framework to determine whether
this rule protects a particular category of defendants. The policy question is
whether “recognizing a duty of care . . . would tend to alter the nature of
[a] sport or chill vigorous participation in the activity.”318 Based on this
policy, Knight and Kahn held that participants, coaches, and sports
instructors do not owe a full duty of due care to sports participants.
Rather, they breach a duty of care “only if [they] intentionally injure [the
plaintiff] or engage[] in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.”319

316. In Priebe v. Nelson, for example, the court wrote that “the defense of primary
assumption of risk” would not bar a claim if the plaintiff did not know of a risk. 140
P.3d 848, 850 (Cal. 2006). If the risk was unknown to the plaintiff, the defense of
assumption of the risk “would not bar [the] claim since [the plaintiff] could not be found
to have assumed a risk of which [he or] she was unaware.” Id. This, of course, directly
contradicts Knight’s statement that its new no-duty primary assumption of the risk regime
“does not depend on the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or appreciation of the
potential risk.” Knight, 834 P.2d at 709.
317. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 87 n.25. When a plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of
injury caused by a defendant’s breach of a duty of care, the amount of the plaintiff’s
recovery is determined by comparative fault principles. The term “secondary assumption
of risk” serves no purpose.
318. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 43 (Cal. 2003).
319. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711; see Kahn, 75 P.3d. at 38–39 (quoting id.). As
previously discussed, the Avila decision might be read to alter this holding. It is best
read as creating an exception—specific to baseball—under which pitchers have no duty
to refrain from throwing at batters.
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Whether a defendant’s conduct meets this standard is a question for the
jury unless no reasonable jury could find the standard to be met.320
The court has also provided a framework for determining whether the
protection of the intentional injury/recklessness rule extends to categories of
defendants other than participants, coaches, and sports instructors. These
other categories include owners of sports facilities and manufacturers of
sports equipment. Because “the question of duty depends not only on
the nature of the sport, but also on the ‘role of the defendant whose
conduct is at issue,’” a court, in addressing this question, should examine
the “role of the [defendant] . . . and the likely effect . . . of imposing [a
duty of due care].”321 Owners of sports facilities and manufacturers of
sports equipment have been,322 and should be, held to a duty of care—
the result foreshadowed by the court’s distinction between the separate
duties owed by a baseball batter and a stadium owner with respect to a
thrown bat.323 Imposing such a duty would not alter the nature of a sport
and is called for by the policy considerations especially relevant to and
underlying the law of premises and products liability, including the
“policy of preventing future harm” and “the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance.”324
In Knight, the court wrote that although “moguls on a ski run pose a
risk of harm to skiers,” a “ski resort has no duty to eliminate them.”325
This was said to be because moguls are an “inherent risk” of the sport of
skiing and “defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.”326 This
statement has been seen to create a second, distinct “no-duty-for-inherent
risk” rule, which has been employed in cases like Connelly—the ski lift
tower case—to protect owners of sports facilities from a duty of care.327
This so-called inherent risk no-duty rule has been the focus of academic
critics who have accused the court of “abusing duty”328 and who have

320. Compare Knight, 834 P.2d at 712 (holding there is no jury question because
the defendant’s conduct was “not even closely comparable to” recklessness) with Shin v.
Ahn, 165 P. 3d 581, 592 (Cal. 2007) (finding this question as being one for the jury to
decide “based on more complete examination of the facts”).
321. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38.
322. See Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006);
Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
323. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38.
324. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968); see Ortega v. Kmart
Corp., 36 P.3d 11, 19 (Cal. 2001).
325. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
326. Id.
327. See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
328. Esper & Keating, supra note 12.
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seen a need to “shield” the duty concept from such abuse.329 None of the
California Supreme Court’s holdings, however, has been based on this
no-duty rule,330 and we believe it is time for the court to make clear that
no such rule exists.
As the court recognized in Parsons, and as was true in its adoption of
the intentional injury/recklessness rule, determinations of duty focus on a
category of conduct—not the specific facts of a case.331 But the focus of
the inherent risk no-duty rule—the second no-duty rule—is all about the
facts of the specific case.332 This is an inappropriate use of the duty
concept. Unlike determinations under the intentional injury/recklessness
rule, fact-specific determinations under the standardless inherent risk noduty rule usurp the role that is properly assigned to juries in our negligence
system. Moreover, such determinations can have the undesirable effect
of trumping determinations, made under the Knight framework, that a
particular category of defendants, such as operators of sports facilities,
owes a sports participant a duty of due care.333 If cases such as Connelly
were correctly decided, it was because, on the facts of the particular
case, there was no negligence as a matter of law.334
The court seems to have believed that the inherent risk concept is
necessary to identify the duty owed by persons who have a relationship
to a sporting activity. Thus, it has written that such persons owe a duty
“to use due care not to increase the risk to a participant over and above
those inherent in the sport.” In fact, however, the inherent risk concept
is not needed to identify the duty owed by persons who have a
relationship to a sporting activity. Under Rowland, such persons owe a
baseline duty of care,335 which would include a duty to use due care not
to increase the risks to a participant over and above the so-called

329. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13.
330. The court in Knight did state that “careless conduct of [sports participants] is
treated as an ‘inherent risk’ of a sport.” 834 P.2d at 708. That, however, was merely a
linguistic characterization. The decision to exempt sports participants from a duty of due
care was based on the policy of not chilling vigorous participation in the sport. See Kahn
v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003).
331. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 8 cmt. b (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
332. See Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
333. Compare Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) with Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689.
334. See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
335. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
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inherent risks of the sport336—unless a court determines, for reasons of
policy, that no duty is owed.337 Moreover, the statement that a defendant
owes a duty “to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant
over and above those inherent in the sport” is meaningless. It does not
tell us what duty is owed. This is because carelessness is considered an
inherent risk of a sport with respect to some defendants, but not as to
others. In fact, the only real use of the inherent risk concept is to cause
confusion. But there is already too much confusion in the no-duty-forsports case law. The court can bring clarity to the law by eliminating the
use of the inherent risk concept.338

336. See Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“Determination of whether a particular design increased the inherent risks . . . would
necessarily focus on the ingredients of a risk/benefit analysis . . . .”).
337. See Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 87 (Cal. 1997).
338. It is not that the word inherent is, in itself, so bad. If it were merely used as an
adjective—like intrinsic or characteristic—there would be no problem. The problem is
that it is used as a substitute for analysis. And this misuse is embedded in the case law.
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